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VEIL PIERCING AND THE UNTAPPED POWER OF 
STATE COURTS 
Catherine A. Hardee* 
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has embraced an anti-majoritarian trend 
toward providing constitutional protections for the elite who own or control corporations. This 
trend is especially troubling as it threatens to undermine the balance found in state corporate 
law between private ordering for internal corporate matters and government regulation to 
police the negative externalities of the corporate form. The Court’s interventions also have the 
potential to leave vulnerable groups without the protection of religiously-neutral laws designed 
to prevent discrimination, protect workers, or provide essential services such as health care. 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet explicitly preempted what has traditionally been the 
province of states, the Court has relied, both implicitly and explicitly, on its own controversial 
definitions of state law as the foundation on which to create speech rights for corporations and 
religious rights for corporate owners. Absent explicit federal preemption, states can and should 
fight back against this creeping federalization of state corporate law. 
This Article provides a roadmap. It suggests modest changes to the veil piercing doctrine 
that can help to restore, at least in part, the balance of power between states and their corporate 
creations. A state court signaling to business owners even a potential for piercing, and thus the 
potential for unlimited personal liability, could discourage corporations doing business in the 
state from seeking religious exemptions to neutrally applicable laws. Most importantly, these 
changes do not threaten to undermine the corporate control mechanisms that have allowed for 
efficient private ordering within corporations, nor will they allow corporations to avoid these 
third-party protections by reincorporating in a different state. Forcing the federal courts to 
confront state assertions of their right to limit and define corporations will, at the very least, 
require the U.S. Supreme Court to be transparent about the extent to which it intends to 
federalize state corporate law, advancing rule of law values like certainty and predictability 
that are important to individuals and corporations alike. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In dodging the substance of the corporate claim in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,1 the United States 
Supreme Court has ensured that the issue of corporate rights will remain 
a subject of ongoing litigation and scholarly critique. Critics of the 
Roberts Court’s expansion of free speech and religious rights to 
corporations argue that the Court is using its anti-majoritarian power to 
protect the rights of powerful elites at the expense of women, labor, and 
                                                     
1. 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
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the poor.2 In addition, the Court’s corporate rights opinions exert pressure 
on state corporate law.3 The Court relied on its own definitions of state 
corporate law to create speech and religious rights for corporations, 
definitions with which many corporate law scholars disagree as a matter 
of state law interpretation.4 The Court has also left to state courts the 
burden of determining how corporations can exercise such rights, creating 
tension between corporate law’s historical purpose of facilitating private 
ordering and its new need to balance the constitutional rights of 
shareholders.5 This Article departs from prior commentary to argue that, 
counterintuitively, this apparent flaw in the Court’s doctrine provides a 
significant opportunity for states to ameliorate the third party harms 
caused by corporate exercise of Court-recognized constitutional rights. In 
short, state corporate law doctrines like piercing the corporate veil provide 
an avenue for states to incrementally reassert their regulatory 
prerogatives, while balancing classic private ordering with corporate 
constitutional rights.6 
The Court’s opinion in Citizens United v. FEC7 sparked a new era of 
corporate rights by granting all corporations the right to political speech.8 
The Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.9 decision gave shareholders of 
certain corporations a statutory right under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) to utilize the corporate form to exercise their 
personal religion.10 These expanded corporate rights, along with other 
                                                     
2. See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015); Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding “We the People’s” Ability to 
Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 423, 440 (2016). 
3. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 657 
(2016) (noting that corporate speech and religious rights “push to state corporate law the task of 
resolving disputes among corporate participants on issues of social, political, and religious 
dimension”). 
4. Such critics include Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr. of the Delaware Supreme Court, the most 
influential corporate law court in the country, who has been an outspoken critic of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s foray into corporate law. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival 
of Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 109 (2015); Leo E. 
Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course? The Tension Between Conservative 
Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 363 (2015). 
5. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, States’ Rights Against Corporate Rights, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
595 (2017); Pollman, supra note 3, at 369. 
6. See infra Part III. 
7. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
8. Id. at 365 (holding that “the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the 
speaker’s corporate identity”). 
9. 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
10. Id. at 2785 (“The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates 
RFRA.”). In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court was expected to determine whether shareholders have 
10 - Hardee.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  8:36 PM 
220 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:217 
 
doctrinal shifts in recent years, have led to concerns that the Roberts Court 
is stacking the deck in favor of corporate elites over the general public.11 
Citizens United and its progeny have made it difficult to limit moneyed 
interests’ ability to influence politics, with election spending skyrocketing 
since the controversial decision.12 Scholars are concerned that the Hobby 
Lobby decision will leave political bodies unable to protect third parties—
especially historically vulnerable populations—from the increasing 
power of corporations in our society.13 Taken together, these trends 
suggest the Roberts Court is reviving a legal era where the judiciary 
prevented the political bodies from enacting legislation to protect 
vulnerable populations from perceived corporate excess.14 
For those concerned with the consolidation of corporate power in 
society, the first best option is for the U.S. Supreme Court to change 
direction and reign in this relatively new corporate rights doctrine.15 Given 
the current composition of the Court, however, that may be unlikely. This 
Article suggests that if reversing course is doubtful as a practical matter, 
focus may be productively directed to ways that state corporate law can 
                                                     
a constitutional right to use their corporation to exercise their personal religion, express artistic 
speech, or some combination of the two. See Eric Segall, Symposium: Disentangling Free Speech and 
Freedom of Religion in Masterpiece Cakeshop, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 13, 2017, 10:33 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/09/symposium-disentangling-free-speech-freedom-religion-
masterpiece-cakeshop/ [https://perma.cc/7HRP-G2QY] (describing potential claims at issue, 
including hybrid speech and free exercise claims); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Symposium: Anti-
Discrimination Laws Do Not Compel Commercial-Merchant Speech, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 14, 2017, 
10:25 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/09/symposium-anti-discrimination-laws-not-compel-
commercial-merchant-speech/ [https://perma.cc/U8AT-P9NY] (describing the difference between 
personal expression and corporate expression). Instead, the Court punted on the substance of the 
claim, leaving the constitutional questions for another day. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra Section I.A. 
12. See infra Section I.A.1. 
13. See infra Section I.A.2. 
14. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527 
(2015) (arguing that conservative legal theorists have set the stage to embrace the economic rights 
doctrine underlying the Lochner decision); Sepper, supra note 2, at 1518 (arguing that corporate First 
Amendment rights “suggest[s] a religious freedom regime that protects rich, powerful, and 
mainstream entities while burdening poor, vulnerable, and minority individuals”); Strine, supra note 
2, at 431–32 (“In sum, although courts have been more receptive to business litigants seeking to 
overturn the decisions of the political branches, the more intensive judicial scrutiny traditionally given 
to legislative policies that are disadvantageous to minority groups and women has seemed to relax.”). 
15. Much of the extensive scholarship on corporate rights focuses on carefully laying out the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s missteps in this area and urging reconsideration. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime & Reva 
Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE 
L.J. 2516, 2519 (2015) (critiquing the Court’s treatment of complicity-based claims); Pollman, supra 
note 3 (critiquing effect of corporate rights on state law); Strine, supra note 2 (same); Amy J. 
Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s 
Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015) (proposing a revised balancing test for complicity claims). 
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be reformed to maintain the balance between corporations and their 
employees and third parties. In doing so, this Article builds on, and 
contributes to, an emerging body of scholarship that urges a more 
muscular use of state corporate law in response to federal 
encroachments.16 
Corporations are creatures of state law.17 The Court recognized this 
when it directed state corporate law to flesh out the free speech and free 
exercise rights it granted to corporations.18 Scholars have noted that state 
corporate law was not designed for this Court-mandated task, but rather 
evolved to allow maximum flexibility to private ordering between 
shareholders and management.19 In addition, states have the power to 
define what constitutes a corporation and what actions fall outside the 
corporate purview.20 So far it has been unclear whether or how these new 
corporate rights alter this traditional power of states to define the 
corporation. First, both Citizens United and Hobby Lobby make 
statements regarding the nature of existing state corporate law that 
scholars have challenged on factual grounds.21 Moreover, it is unclear 
whether the Court’s pronouncements about the way state corporate law is 
are in fact statements about the way corporate law must be under the 
Constitution.22 
The uncertainty in the Court’s doctrine creates a threat of a creeping 
federalization of state corporate law if states blindly assimilate corporate 
rights into existing doctrine. States concerned with growing corporate 
power should actively engage with these new federal rights to find a new 
                                                     
16. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who 
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010) (arguing that state corporate law should create special 
decision-making rules for corporate political speech); Buccola, supra note 5 (providing justification 
for state power in this area); Joseph K. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, 86 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 477 (2015) (arguing that political expenditures could constitute bad faith under state 
corporate law). 
17. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 644 (noting that “corporate law developed primarily as a matter 
of state statutory and common law”). 
18. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (“State 
corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts [about the corporation’s religion] 
by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure.”); Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010) (holding that “procedures of corporate democracy” will determine 
who speaks for the corporation).  
19. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 639 (arguing that corporate rights place “a new reliance on state 
corporate law that gives a quasi-constitutional dimension to governance rules that were developed in 
a different era and with a different focus”); infra Section II.B. 
20. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 598–99. 
21. See infra Section II.B. 
22. See infra Section II.B. 
10 - Hardee.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  8:36 PM 
222 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:217 
 
equilibrium that balances the need for corporate flexibility with the desire 
to protect vulnerable citizens.23 In doing so, states can use their traditional 
power to define corporate law to force clarification by the federal courts.24 
An ideal test case would utilize an existing common law doctrine that can 
be adapted to protect third parties without dramatic changes to the internal 
governance rules of the corporation.25 
This Article proposes that states could adapt the existing doctrine of 
veil piercing to use in circumstances when shareholders have claimed 
religious exemptions from neutrally applicable laws. Veil piercing—the 
practice of disregarding the limited liability shield of the corporation and 
exposing shareholders to personal liability—is appropriate when there is 
“such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the 
corporation and the individual no longer exist.”26 A shareholder claiming 
an exemption to a neutrally applicable law by utilizing the corporation as 
a vehicle with which to exercise their personal rights arguably displays 
just such unity of interest, at least with respect to certain creditors or 
claims.27 States have defined limited liability as available only to 
shareholders who maintain a separation from their corporation and who 
use the corporation to further the corporation’s ends rather than for 
personal purposes.28 Thus, courts should take into account a shareholder’s 
prior professed unity with their corporation and their use of the 
corporation to pursue purely personal ends when the same shareholder 
seeks to use the corporation to shield their personal assets.29 
In addition to finding substantial support in existing veil piercing 
doctrine, this proposal has several practical benefits. First, veil piercing 
involves adjudicating the rights of third parties, so states should not feel 
compelled by the internal affairs doctrine to apply the law of the state of 
incorporation.30 This prevents opportunistic shareholders from 
incorporating in another state while still harming the citizens of the states 
where they do business. Second, because veil piercing is an equitable 
common law doctrine, state courts can, through incremental changes, 
                                                     
23. See infra Section II.C. 
24. See infra Section II.C. 
25. See infra Part III. 
26. Automotriz Del Golfo De Cal. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 63 (Cal. 1957). 
27. See infra Section III.B.1. 
28. See infra Section III.A. 
29. See infra Section III.B.1. 
30. See Gregory S. Crespi, Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing Litigation: Why Courts Should Discard 
the Internal Affairs Rule and Embrace General Choice of Law Principles, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 85 (2008); infra Section III.C.1. 
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clearly and thoughtfully develop a body of law in response to new 
corporate rights.31 Although any action by state courts to minimize the 
impact of expanded federal corporate rights is likely to meet stiff 
opposition, clarification of state law regarding corporate structure and 
purpose will, at the very least, force the U.S. Supreme Court to be upfront 
about the extent to which it intends to federalize corporate law. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes how recent 
decisions by the Supreme Court granting corporate rights have expanded 
the power of corporations, tipping the balance of power in favor of 
corporate elites over traditionally disadvantaged groups. Although some 
scholars hold out hope that corporate social responsibility will rebalance 
power, this Part argues that by allowing corporate management to thwart 
external regulation, corporate rights remove the only remaining check on 
the power of corporate insiders. Part II examines the traditional power of 
states to create and define corporations and explores how the Court’s 
recent rights decisions encroach on that power. It concludes by advocating 
that states that are concerned about the negative impact of corporate 
exemptions to laws designed to protect third parties should reassert their 
power to define corporate structure and purpose to discourage 
corporations from claiming such exemptions. Finally, Part III provides a 
roadmap for how states can reassert themselves. It argues that when 
engaging in a veil piercing analysis, state courts should take into account 
the fact that a shareholder has claimed a prior exemption to the law based 
on a unity of interest between shareholder and corporation. This is not 
only a doctrinally sound adaptation to personal exemptions for 
corporations, but it also has practical advantages that may help states 
better defend themselves when challenged in federal court. While the 
outcome of any proposal to discourage corporations from claiming rights-
based exemptions is uncertain, states’ assertion of their own authority 
will, at the very least, force the U.S. Supreme Court to be transparent 
about the lengths to which it intends to federalize corporate law. 
I. THE EXPANDING POWER OF CORPORATIONS 
Scholars have accused the Roberts Court of ushering in a quiet 
revolution that is turning Carolene Products footnote four on its head.32 
                                                     
31. See infra Section III.C.2. 
32. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which 
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
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Rather than protecting “discrete and insular minorities,” they argue the 
Court is wielding its anti-majoritarian power to protect “corporate 
elites.”33 The Court has issued several landmark rulings with respect to 
corporate power, most notably Citizens United v. FEC and Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., which gave corporations a right to evade 
democratically imposed mandates. Critics argue that these cases, taken 
together with the Court’s opinions on labor unions34 and voting rights,35 
have served to expand the power of corporations and advance an anti-
regulatory agenda at the expense of the democratic power of women, 
people of color, and the poor.36 
Some believe that the Court’s denouncement of the shareholder profit 
maximization principle in Hobby Lobby paves the way for corporations to 
exercise these corporate rights on behalf of other stakeholders, leading to 
more corporate social responsibility.37 This hope seems unlikely to 
materialize, however, when considering where the Court located the 
ability to exercise these rights and the practical realities of corporate 
governance.38 
A. Corporate Rights: Increasing the Power of the Powerful 
1. Campaign Finance 
The issue of campaign finance naturally holds a central position in 
debates over wealth and the balance of power in society. Campaign 
donations and independent expenditures on behalf of political candidates 
make politicians more responsive to donor needs.39 In addition, the sheer 
                                                     
33. See, e.g., Sepper, supra note 2, at 1510 (“For-profit corporations are not the insular or religious 
minority individuals of past accommodations, but politically powerful religious and commercial 
entities—the very centerpiece of regulatory efforts.” (citation omitted)); Strine, supra note 2, at 431 
(noting that under Carolene Products, courts intervened to protect those who “could not sufficiently 
protect themselves at the ballot box” but now “federal courts appear more inclined to come up with 
reasons to upset the determination of political branches” for “those with the most resources—such as 
business corporations”). But see Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 
116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1916 (2016) (arguing that U.S. Supreme Court has long used the First 
Amendment in a “Lochnerian” fashion). 
34. See infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
35. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 579 (2013) (striking down key portions of the Voting Rights Act). 
36. See generally Sepper, supra note 2; Strine, supra note 2.  
37. See Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 804 (2015) 
(arguing that Hobby Lobby embraces a progressive view of the corporation). 
38. See infra Section  I.B. 
39. See Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions After McCutcheon, Citizens United, 
and SpeechNow, 67 FLA. L. REV. 389, 425 (2015) (noting that campaign contributions influence 
politicians). Even within the Citizens United opinion itself, Justice Kennedy recognized that “[i]t is 
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amount of money in the political system shapes the discourse because the 
fundraising needs of all candidates make both parties responsive to 
moneyed interests.40 
Some scholars see Citizens United as the Roberts Court’s first step in 
expanding control by the wealthy over American politics by allowing 
unlimited expenditures in support of a candidate directly from corporate 
coffers.41 In that case, the majority exceeded even the plaintiff’s request 
for relief and struck down the McCain-Feingold Act’s prohibition on 
corporate expenditures as facially invalid because corporations have a 
First Amendment right to speak.42 The Court clarified that its holding 
applies not just to nonprofit corporations created to convey a message, 
such as the plaintiff in the case, but also to for-profit corporations, 
including public corporations.43 
The ability to exercise this corporate speech right was vested in the 
board of directors, who have the power under corporate law to make 
decisions on behalf of the corporation and its shareholders.44 It is 
important to note that directors of public corporations as a class are 
notoriously unrepresentative of society at large.45 Public company 
                                                     
in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor 
the voters and contributors who support those policies.” Id. at 427 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)). 
40. Strine, supra note 2, at 445 (noting that “[w]hen money matters, candidates must find it to win,” 
which creates an agenda driven by the fact that “both parties must look to moneyed interests for their 
political survival”). 
41. Id. at 433 (“As is well known, the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United gave 
corporations the ability to influence the political process more directly, which has therefore in turn 
made elected officials more responsive to moneyed interests, and therefore, as a matter of logic, less 
responsive to less wealthy citizens.”). 
42. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 327 (rejecting narrow holding); Eric W. Orts, Theorizing the Firm: 
Organizational Ontology in the Supreme Court, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 559, 580 (2016) (noting the 
Court’s broad holding). 
43. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362. 
44. Id. (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)) (The Bellotti opinion 
describes the corporate procedures as the shareholders’ ability to elect the board of directors, who 
manage the corporation, and to sue for breaches of fiduciary duty). Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794–95; see 
also Catherine A. Hardee, Who’s Causing the Harm, 106 KY. L.J. 751 (2018).  
45. A 2016 report found that over 85% of Fortune 500 company directors are white, while fewer 
than 8% are African American and 3.5% are Hispanic/Latinx. Women make up only 20% of boards. 
ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES REPORT: THE 2016 BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN 
AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS 13 (2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/center-for-board-effectiveness/articles/board-diversity-
census-missing-pieces.html?id=us:2el:3dp:adbcenpr16:awa:ccg:020617 [https://perma.cc/LL4B-
7N8L]; see also Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much 
Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 379 (2014) (providing statistics on the 
lack of diversity on corporate boards). 
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shareholders—the more representative body of the corporation—have 
little to no influence over corporate decisions.46 
As the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court has noted, 
Delaware law “requires corporate directors to manage the corporation in 
the best interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”47 The only goal that 
all shareholders of a corporation can be certain to share is the desire for 
corporate profit.48 Profit maximization suggests that corporations “will 
focus any involvement in the political process on electing candidates who 
will support public policies favorable to corporate interests,” including 
fewer regulations, or regulations that benefit their industry or company, 
and lower taxes.49 Focusing primarily on shareholder profits, however, 
may not align with many, or even most, shareholders’ overall values. 
Unlike corporations, humans have a wide variety of interests, which 
manifest themselves in virtually infinite sets of preferences.50 However, 
this does not mean that directors may never consider other interests. 
Directors still have broad discretion under the business judgment rule to 
support environmental, labor, or social issues so long as such support is 
couched in a belief that it is in the long-term interest of the company.51 
The evidence regarding the impact of the Citizens United decision is 
mixed. Some argue that the decision may not have actually led to an 
increase in political expenditures made directly by public corporations.52 
Others have pointed out that there were undoubtedly massive increases in 
spending after the decision and that much of that spending was “dark 
money,” i.e., money that cannot be traced to its source.53 Much of this 
dark money “was funneled through trade associations like the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce,” leading to a “deep suspicion that much of this 
                                                     
46. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. 
REV. 995, 1037 (1998) (describing how shareholder votes are structurally designed to largely favor 
management); Strine, supra note 2, at 443–44 (noting that most shareholders own stock through 
intermediaries such as mutual or pension funds and therefore do not have the right to vote or to sell 
their stocks). 
47. Strine, supra note 2, at 440. 
48. Greenwood, supra note 46, at 1049 (“While real people must balance competing 
interests . . . corporations . . . just maximize shareholder value.”); Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 347. 
49. Strine, supra note 2, at 441. 
50. See Greenwood, supra note 46, at 998 (noting that “important and widely shared values conflict 
or are self-contradictory” and citizens are faced with balancing different sets of values that might 
conflict with corporate profits). 
51. Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 347. 
52. Alschuler, supra note 39, at 418 (arguing that there is little evidence that large corporations 
made more independent expenditures on behalf of candidates after Citizens United). 
53. CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, CORPORATE CITIZEN? AN ARGUMENT FOR THE SEPARATION OF 
CORPORATION AND STATE 14 (2016). 
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dark money came from corporations exercising their new Citizens United 
rights to spend.”54 We may never know how big of a part direct corporate 
spending has played in the massive increases in election spending and 
increasing influence by wealthy donors, including business leaders.55 In 
addition, the Court’s reasoning was used to strike down other campaign 
finance restrictions, most notably by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in 
SpeechNow.org v. FEC,56 invalidating contribution limits to Super PACs, 
and later by the Court in McCutcheon v. FEC57 to do away with the 
aggregate limits on contributions to candidates or PACs.58 
Regardless of its origins, money undoubtedly influences the political 
system. Business leaders report that they believe that the campaign 
finance system is “pay-to-play.”59 There is evidence that business leaders 
and the corporations they run are pressured to donate to politicians to 
avoid unfavorable political action against the company’s interests.60 The 
pressure to donate to ensure business interests are protected helps to 
explain why business groups, individual corporations, and their 
executives donate to both major political parties in large amounts.61 The 
effect of such spending ensures that both political parties are responsive 
to corporate interests. 
                                                     
54. Id.; see also id. at 14–15 (describing inadvertent disclosures of corporate spending via lawsuits 
and bankruptcy filings that confirm that at least some of this dark money originated from 
corporations). 
55. Id. (describing exponential increases in election spending after Citizens United, but noting that 
direct contributions to campaigns from large public corporations did not increase); Strine, supra note 
2, at 437 (noting that not all the increase is spending comes from corporations, but that the increase 
in spending is linked to corporate influence). 
56. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
57. 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
58. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 393 (“A super PAC is a political action committee that does 
not contribute to the official campaigns of candidates for office but instead prepares and places its 
own advertisements supporting candidates and/or disparaging their opponents.”). Professor Alschuler 
describes how Citizens United was used by the D.C. Circuit in SpeechNow.org v. FEC to strike down 
any limits on donations to super PACs. Id.; see also Strine, supra note 2, at 437–38. 
59. See Jennifer Mueller, The Unwilling Donor, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1783, 1816 (2015) (“A 2013 
poll of 302 business leaders by the non-partisan Committee for Economic Development found that 
seventy-five percent of respondents reported that the U.S. campaign finance system is ‘pay-to-play,’ 
and sixty-four percent believe it is a serious problem.”). 
60. See id. at 1817–18 (describing the unwilling donor and pressure put on business executives by 
legislators). 
61. Id. at 1814 (noting that individuals and PACs donate to both parties in large amounts). 
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The increase in campaign spending leaves the poor with less influence 
in the political process. The cost of elections has gone up dramatically.62 
As a natural corollary, the cost of access to politicians has risen as well.63 
For example, one study unambiguously demonstrated that elected 
representatives and their senior staffers are willing to meet “considerably 
more frequently” with donors than non-donor constituents.64 This result is 
not surprising as politicians are forced to spend increasing amounts of 
time raising campaign funds.65 The need to fundraise means that 
politicians on both sides of the aisle must be responsive to moneyed 
interests in crafting their agendas.66 
2. Religious Exemptions 
Corporate influence over the political process is exacerbated by 
allowing corporations religious exemptions to neutrally applicable laws 
and regulations that survive the democratic process. The ability of 
corporations to claim exemptions to the law based on the religious beliefs 
of corporate owners provides an avenue to erode democratically enacted 
protections.67 It is especially worrisome because the religious exemptions 
claimed by corporations thus far are broader than traditional religious 
claims. These claims generally involve “religious objections to being 
made complicit in the assertedly sinful conduct of others.”68 Such 
                                                     
62. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 418 (describing the “stunning increase” in spending following 
Citizens United and SpeechNow, with spending on elections nearly tripling in the elections 
immediately following the cases). 
63. See, e.g., Editorial, The Soaring Price of Political Access, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/opinion/sunday/the-soaring-price-of-political-access.html 
[https://perma.cc/KF97-EPP3] (reporting that both parties planned to increase tenfold the cost of 
exclusive dinners with candidates and party leaders, with Republicans charging $1.34 million per 
couple, and Democrats charging $1.6 million). 
64. Mueller, supra note 59, at 1816–17 (describing study). 
65. See Ezra Klein, The Most Depressing Graphic for Members of Congress, WASH. POST (Jan. 
14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/14/the-most-depressing-
graphic-for-members-of-congress/?utm_term=.302bb0f829a9 [https://perma.cc/XB5H-ZUXZ] 
(discussing a leaked Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee document that suggests 
spending four hours a day on fundraising calls and additional time on “constituent visits” and 
“strategic outreach,” which also likely includes time with donors). 
66. Strine, supra note 2, at 445; TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 53, at 59 (describing the 
phenomenon of corporate donors making donations to both parties to insure influence); id. at 61–62 
(quoting candidates and others discussing the influence of money on political agendas). 
67. See Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. J. 
GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 305 (2014) [hereinafter Sepper, Contraception] (noting that giving 
secular corporations the same exemptions as religious organizations risks eroding “gender equality 
and religious freedom in all workplaces”). 
68. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 15, at 2519. 
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“complicity-based conscience claims” do not involve actions by the 
corporation but rather focus on a third party’s conduct and the claimant’s 
belief that the lawful conduct of that third party is sinful.69 In Hobby 
Lobby, petitioners’ claim was not that they were required to use certain 
contraception. Instead they objected to paying for insurance that some 
employees, in connection with their doctors, might utilize to purchase 
forms of contraception that petitioners believed were sinful.70 Similarly, 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, petitioner argued that decorating a cake for a 
gay wedding makes him complicit in what he views as a sinful marriage.71 
Complicity-based religious claims have the potential to cause great 
harm to third parties.72 In the employment context, these claims require 
an employee to make a particular decision with which the corporate 
employer disagrees, thus they necessarily involve subordinating the 
employee’s right “to make his or her own moral decisions.”73 As such, the 
ability for corporations to raise complicity-based claims has the potential 
to put much more of employees’ lives under the influence of their 
employers.74 When the believed sinful conduct is engaged in by members 
of the public, the burden of the corporation’s exemption falls on that 
group. When large numbers of exemptions are claimed alleging sinful 
behavior by a discrete group, “accommodating the claim has the 
distinctive power to stigmatize and demean third parties.”75 
                                                     
69. See id.; Sepinwall, supra note 15, at 1905. 
70. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014). 
71. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1724 (2018). 
72. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 15, at 2527 (“Complicity-based conscience claims are 
oriented toward third parties who do not share the claimant’s beliefs about the conduct in question. 
For this reason, their accommodation has distinctive potential to impose material and dignitary harm 
on those the claimants condemn.”); Sepinwall, supra note 15, at 1973 (arguing that complicity claims’ 
potential for third party harms means courts should focus on balancing third party costs rather than 
the scope of complicity). 
73. Sepper, Contraception, supra note 67, at 337. 
74. There is historical precedent for massive intrusion on employees’ personal lives based on the 
employer’s desire to cabin the sins of employees. See Strine, supra note 4, at 79 (describing how 
employers in the late nineteenth century mandated church attendance and dictated moral standards to 
employees, including how to maintain their appearance and how to spend their wages). More recent 
examples include unsuccessful efforts by corporations to avoid anti-discrimination laws on religious 
grounds in order to force employees to attend trainings that teach that “women’s place is in the home” 
and to discriminate against non-Christians, gays, and “women working without the consent of their 
fathers or husbands.” Sepper, supra note 2, at 1515–16. 
75. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 15, at 2566; see Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 
(recognizing that widespread refusal to serve gay couples would “result[] in a community-wide stigma 
inconsistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws”). 
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Religious exemptions by corporations have thus far largely come at the 
expense of the reproductive and privacy rights of female employees and 
are particularly burdensome on low-income employees.76 Religious 
exemptions by corporations are not necessarily limited to women’s 
reproductive issues, however. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court left 
open the possibility that corporations serving the public may have a Free 
Exercise right to thwart anti-discrimination public accommodation laws, 
with three Justices strongly signaling they would favor such an 
exemption.77 
Even if limited to the statutory exemptions under RFRA in Hobby 
Lobby, religious exemptions by corporations have the potential to 
undermine regulatory efforts across the board as settled legal questions 
about the ability of the law to regulate the employer–employee 
relationship are thrown into doubt.78 In Hobby Lobby, the majority 
dismissed these potential harms to employees by noting that the 
government could achieve the goal of universal contraceptive coverage 
by simply utilizing a workaround or by providing coverage as a 
government benefit.79 The majority noted that the statute already contains 
such a workaround for religious nonprofit employers, requiring insurance 
companies to provide contraceptive coverage to employees of objecting 
religious nonprofits free of charge.80 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy 
relied heavily on the availability of this workaround as a less restrictive 
means of accomplishing the mandate’s goals.81 
                                                     
76. The contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act was designed to ensure access to 
contraceptive care for poor and low-income women by removing the cost barrier, including co-pays. 
See Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, The Union of Contraceptive Services and the Affordable Care Act Gives 
Birth to First Amendment Concerns, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 539, 540–44 (2013) (summarizing 
evidence in favor of contraceptive mandate). Contraceptive coverage provides myriad health benefits 
to women, including avoiding unintended pregnancies and ensuring healthier intended pregnancies. 
See id. at 541–42; Seema Mohapatra, Time to Lift the Veil of Inequality in Health-Care Coverage: 
Using Corporate Law to Defend the Affordable Care Act, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 137, 179 (2015); 
Sepper, Contraception, supra note 67, at 336. 
77. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734–40 (Gorsuch, J., joined by Alito, J., concurring); 
id. at 1740–48 (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
78. See Sepper, supra note 2, at 1513 (noting that enjoining the contraceptive mandate injects a 
“formalist view of employment relations into religious liberty doctrine [that] calls into question the 
regulation of employers”). 
79. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781–82 (2014). At 
oral argument for Masterpiece Cakeshop, several Justices appeared to embrace a similar argument 
that there is no harm from businesses discriminating against the LGBTQ community so long as they 
can buy the same item from a different establishment. Transcript of Oral Argument at 62–64, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
80. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782–83. 
81. Id. at 2787.  
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Even if the harm from religious exemptions could be ameliorated by 
direct government provisions of benefits or through exemptions to the 
regulatory framework, these are frequently not a practical option. 
Government-provided health insurance has thus far proven politically 
impossible and a separate program to provide government-funded 
contraceptive coverage to all women seems even less likely. In addition, 
exemptions make general regulations more expensive to administer and 
implement, making regulations less likely to be adopted.82 
That may, in fact, be the larger goal of advocates for complicity-based 
conscience claims. Unlike traditional exemptions claimed by religious 
minorities seeking to engage in religious practices disfavored by the 
majority, these claims are “asserted in society-wide conflicts by mobilized 
groups and individuals acting in coalitions that reach across religious 
denominational lines and in coordination with a political party.”83 This 
coalition includes two major religious groups—Catholics and Evangelical 
Protestants—who have joined together with the Republican Party since 
the late 1970s in an attempt to reestablish laws relating to traditional moral 
views on sexuality, abortion, and contraception.84 When the legislative 
process fails to provide an avenue to “chang[e] the sexual mores of the 
wider community . . . [s]eeking an exemption to avoid complicity in the 
sins of others can serve the same end.”85 Accommodating such claims 
allows claimants to preserve prior legal restrictions on the “sinful” 
activities of disfavored groups by recharacterizing the private policing of 
such behavior as necessary to support religious pluralism.86 
The financial power of corporations who could claim exemptions 
should not be underestimated. The Court in Hobby Lobby does not define 
“closely held corporation,”87 but the corporations in the case demonstrate 
                                                     
82. See Strine, supra note 2, at 458–59 (noting that “carve-outs and work-arounds” increase costs 
and lessen accountability and efficiency of government programs). 
83. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 15, at 2542–43. 
84. See id. at 2544–52 (detailing decades-long campaign organized by religious groups in 
connection with the Republican party). 
85. Id. at 2552. 
86. Professors Nejaime and Siegel refer to this process as “preservation through transformation.” 
Id. at 2553 (“Accommodating complicity-based conscience claims in these circumstances may 
function to enable ‘preservation through transformation’: when an existing legal regime is 
successfully challenged so that its rules and reasons no longer seem persuasive or legitimate, 
defenders may adopt new rules and reasons that preserve elements of the challenged regime.”). 
87. Indeed, there is no single definition of closely held corporation. See Elizabeth Pollman, 
Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 149, 
163–64 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson eds., 2016) [hereinafter Pollman, 
Corporate Law] (noting that there is no single definition for the term in corporate law and the U.S. 
Supreme Court utilized a “general understanding” of the term). 
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that the label does not limit the holding to “small businesses.”88 Any 
corporation whose controlling shareholders agree to run the corporation 
according to the same religious tenets may be able to claim an 
exemption.89 The most likely types of corporations to fit this bill are 
family-controlled corporations, like Hobby Lobby. These corporations are 
significant drivers in our economy.90 More than 30% of all companies 
with sales in excess of one billion dollars are family-controlled 
enterprises.91 
Even smaller “mom and pop” shops like Masterpiece Cakeshop—
owned by a married couple—represent a powerful force. The owners of 
                                                     
88. At the time of the case, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. had more than 13,000 employees and 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. employed 950 people, making neither company a “small business” 
under the Small Business Association’s definition. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 
__, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764, 2765 (2014); see also U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS 1 (2012) [hereinafter FAQ], https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_Sept_2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BD75-LXUU] (defining a small business as any business having fewer than 500 
employees). Mardel employed almost 400 people at the time of the case, making it the only “small 
business” involved. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765. 
89. There is no definition of closely held corporations in either the opinion or in the law, but the 
Court found that the corporations at issue qualified for the mandate because they were “owned and 
controlled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed the sincerity of their religious 
beliefs.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774. This suggests that to qualify for an exemption, a 
corporation’s shareholders must have the same sincerely held religious beliefs. See Jennifer S. Taub, 
Is Hobby Lobby A Tool for Limiting Corporate Constitutional Rights?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 403, 
426–27 (2015). 
90. See Hardee, supra note 44, at 755–57 (describing economic impact of small and family-run 
businesses). 
91. Nicolas Kachaner, George Stalk, Jr. & Alain Block, What You Can Learn from Family 
Business, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2012, at 103, 103. The Court in Hobby Lobby refused to exclude 
the possibility of an exemption for publicly held corporations, merely noting that such corporations 
are unlikely to claim exemptions for “practical” reasons—namely that unrelated shareholders would 
be unlikely to agree to it. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774. It is perhaps not so unlikely though. One 
third of S&P 500 companies have some level of family control. Claudio Fernández-Aráoz, Sonny 
Iqbal & Jörg Ritter, Leadership Lessons from Great Family Businesses, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2015, 
at 83, 84. For example, Tyson Foods was founded by a devout Christian whose grandson is now the 
CEO. The company is a public company, but the family’s religious influence can be seen in the 
company providing 120 chaplains to minister to employees and donating 25,000 booklets that “guide 
families through the process of saying grace at the dinner table.” Justin Rohrlich, Religious CEOs: 
Tyson Foods’ John Tyson, MINYANVILLE (May 19, 2010), http://www.minyanville.com/special-
features/articles/john-tyson-christian-church-chaplain-methodist/5/19/2010/id/28276 
[https://perma.cc/99U6-9KF4]. The Court left open whether unanimity is required among voting 
shareholders, but the fact that the Court did not even reference Hobby Lobby’s nonvoting 
shareholders suggests that a public corporation with significant nonvoting stock could still qualify. 
Going public with few voting shareholders and large swaths of nonvoting shareholders has been a 
practice for family businesses and is growing in popularity with other companies. See Keith Griffith, 
Viacom and 27 Other Stocks That Come with Restricted Voting Rights, THESTREET (June 23, 2016, 
10:55 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13612197/1/viacom-and-27-other-stocks-that-come-
with-restricted-voting-rights.html [https://perma.cc/3Q2L-62UP]. 
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Masterpiece Cakeshop have been portrayed by some as powerless victims, 
and it is true that they have fewer resources than the families who own the 
multi-million dollar corporations in Hobby Lobby.92 However, even the 
individual owners of small businesses are in a position of power over their 
employees, and when taken collectively, they employ nearly half of 
America’s workforce.93 This has the potential to give a more economically 
elite class the ability to regulate the sexual choices of a large percentage 
of Americans, even when the democratic process has determined that such 
choices are protected.94 Representing nearly 43% of private sector output, 
small businesses likewise provide a significant portion of public goods 
and services.95 Collective action by even a small percentage of such 
businesses can impose significant economic and dignitary harm on those 
engaged in protected behavior that is deemed “sinful” by business 
owners.96 By giving corporations the power to police the “sinful” behavior 
of their employees and third parties, the Roberts Court is again, on 
balance, taking the side of the more economically powerful party. 
Although Hobby Lobby and Citizens United each create corporate 
rights, the former differs from the campaign finance decisions in that it 
gives the power to claim an exemption to the shareholders rather than the 
board of directors.97 The effect of both cases is the same: they concentrate 
                                                     
92. See, e.g., James Gottry, Bakers Should Be Allowed to Have Their Cake—and Their Freedom, 
HILL (Oct. 13, 2017, 2:20 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/355341-bakers-should-be-
allowed-to-have-their-cake-and-their-freedom [https://perma.cc/9NGP-3AN9] (giving sympathetic 
profile of Jack Phillips and noting the loss to his business); George F. Will, A Cake Is Food, Not 
Speech. But Why Bully the Baker?, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-cake-is-food-not-speech-but-why-bully-the-
baker/2017/12/01/7e05773c-d5f0-11e7-b62d-d9345ced896d_story.html?utm_term=.14417909e547 
[https://perma.cc/FE6P-F8NH] (arguing that it was “nasty” for the gay couple to “sic[] the 
government” on Phillips and noting that Phillips has lost 40% of his business because he stopped 
making wedding cakes to comply with the law). 
93. See FAQ, supra note 88, at 1; Hardee, supra note 44, at 755–57 (describing economic power 
of small businesses).  
94. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 15, at 2556 (arguing that “conscience provisions allow 
advocates to rework a traditional norm that was once enforced through the criminal law into a norm 
that is now enforced through a web of exemptions in the civil law”). 
95. See FAQ, supra note 88, at 1 (42.9%). 
96. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 15, at 2566 (“When a religious claim objecting to others’ 
sinful conduct is based on a traditional norm that is reiterated by a mass movement over time and 
across social domains, accommodating the claim has the distinctive power to stigmatize and demean 
third parties.”). This is especially true when corporations in a geographic area band together to target 
a disfavored group. See id.  
97. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“[P]rotecting 
the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the 
religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.”). See Hardee, supra note 44, 
at 770–78 (arguing Court has created an aggregate utility theory of the corporation by which 
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the ability to wield corporate power in the most elite hands—the owners 
of a closely held corporation and the management of a public corporation. 
This concentration of corporate power in the hands of the few stands in 
stark contrast to the Court’s treatment of labor unions.98 The Court in 
Citizens United allows management to use shareholder funds to speak on 
behalf of the corporation regardless of individual shareholder agreement. 
With respect to labor unions, the Roberts Court has only strengthened the 
ability of employees to withhold funds from unions that bargain on their 
behalf.99 While discussed in terms of protecting employee speech rights, 
the effect is to disperse power to each individual employee or member, 
leaving the union as an entity weaker. In other words, corporations may 
draw in and concentrate the rights and economic power of its constituent 
members and wield that power through the corporate form, while labor 
unions are not afforded that option. 
B. Corporate Social Responsibility Will Not Rebalance Power 
Some scholars hope that the Hobby Lobby decision contains the 
solution to the problem of corporations utilizing the power of the 
corporate form to reinforce power imbalances in society.100 In the Hobby 
Lobby opinion, the Court stated for the first time that corporate purpose is 
not limited to the pursuit of profit.101 Some advocates of increased 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) have heralded this decision as a 
victory for CSR.102 The CSR movement has long tried to encourage 
                                                     
shareholders may use the corporation to further their personal ends); Pollman, supra note 87, at 165–
66 (describing the corporation as a tool to be used by the shareholders to exercise their ends). This 
distinction is critical in the veil piercing analysis. See infra Section III.B.1. 
98. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens 
United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 819–27 (2012) (describing differences between treatment of 
corporate and union expenditures); Strine, supra note 2, at 450–53. 
99. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2459 (2018); Strine, supra note 2, at 452 (noting that “the Roberts Court ha[s], if anything, widened the 
gap [between corporations and labor unions] and made it more difficult for unions to exercise voice”).  
100. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 37, at 804 (praising Hobby Lobby as “a ringing endorsement 
of the stakeholder conception of the corporation that many liberals and progressives prefer”); Lyman 
Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 22 (2014) (calling the 
Hobby Lobby opinion “a landmark in corporate law” that furthers the CSR movement). 
101. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770–71 (“While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-
profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations 
to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so.”).  
102. See McDonnell, supra note 37, at 804. Even among supporters, there is some criticism of the 
case on CSR grounds, as the opinion still requires that shareholders approve of the social purpose of 
the corporation rather than a stronger version of the stakeholder model, which would allow 
management to consider non-shareholders without shareholder approval. Id. at 804–05. 
10 - Hardee.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  8:36 PM 
2019] VEIL PIERCING AND THE POWER OF STATE COURTS 235 
 
corporations to exceed the minimum standards owed to non-shareholder 
corporate stakeholders, including employees, the environment, and 
society as a whole.103 
Advocates of CSR are frequently critiqued by conservative corporate 
scholars who argue that shareholders are the only corporate constituency 
with the power to hold management accountable, and thus, the only group 
to whom the board of directors owe fiduciary duties.104 Because the only 
common interest among all shareholders is a desire for profit, they argue 
that is the only appropriate goal for the corporation.105 This requirement 
that corporate purpose be limited to the pursuit of profits is commonly 
referred to as the shareholder profit maximization theory.106 
Even conservative corporate scholars agree, however, that if 
management believes that exceeding regulatory standards, promoting 
labor’s interests, or donating to social causes will be in the best interest of 
the corporation and its shareholders in the long term, management is free 
to enact such policies.107 Management has broad discretion under the 
business judgment rule to make such determinations, with courts very 
rarely finding liability for socially conscious acts by corporations or even 
large charitable donations made by corporations.108 Management need 
only couch their discretion to do so in terms that prioritize shareholders’ 
common interest in profiting from their investment in the corporation.109 
                                                     
103. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605 (2001) (providing an excellent history of CSR movement 
through the modern governance movement); Cheryl L. Wade, Effective Compliance with 
Antidiscrimination Law: Corporate Personhood, Purpose and Social Responsibility, 74 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1187, 1192 (2017) (providing definitions of CSR). 
104. Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 346–47 (summarizing conservative corporate law theory and 
discussing scholars who favor it). 
105. Id. at 351–52. 
106. Id. at 347 (“Put simply, conservative corporate theory embraces the notion that seeking profit 
for the stockholders is the only proper end.”). 
107. See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 273 (1992) (noting that the differences between CSR and profit maximization 
can be largely “papered over” because of the broad latitude given to management to determine what 
is best for the long term interests of the company); Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 347 (“Under this 
theory, that does not mean that corporate managers cannot consider other constituencies and interests 
affected by the corporation’s conduct—such as employees, customers, communities in which it 
operates, and society generally—but it does mean that they can only do so when that is instrumental 
to profit generation.”). 
108. Management’s discretion is so broad that the claim for corporate waste is often referred to as 
a “theoretical exception” to the business judgment rule. Large corporate donations have been 
sanctioned by the courts. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) (approving a donation valued 
at over $140 million). 
109. Take for example, Marriott’s decision to remove pay-per-view pornography from its hotel 
rooms. The Marriott company was founded by a devout Mormon and the company has been 
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Thus the shareholder profit maximization theory is not incompatible with 
corporations engaging in the activities that CSR advocates.110 
While the Court in Hobby Lobby explicitly rejects the premise that 
corporations must be driven by profit motives alone, at least with respect 
to some corporations, it is a mistake to read the decision as supporting 
CSR. Religious exemptions do not involve shareholders exceeding the 
minimum requirements of the law to further the interests of other 
corporate stakeholders. Instead they permit shareholders to provide less 
for other corporate stakeholders and the general public than the law 
requires from their competitors in order to further the shareholders’ own 
personal religious interests.111 The Hobby Lobby decision demonstrates 
this: the shareholder families involved took away their employees’ 
statutory right to contraceptive coverage in order to further the family 
members’ own religious interests.112 
                                                     
influenced by the Marriott family’s religious beliefs. See Kim Bhasin & Melanie Hicken, 17 Big 
Companies That Are Intensely Religious, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2012, 11:29 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/17-big-companies-that-are-intensely-religious-2012-1#alaska-air-7 
[https://perma.cc/NVP9-LZT9]. Two members of the Marriott family sit on the board of directors, 
including the founder’s son who is the chairman of the board. See Board of Directors, MARRIOTT, 
https://marriott.gcs-web.com/board-of-directors [https://perma.cc/6NR2-79SW]. J.W. Marriott, Jr. 
was the CEO and Mitt Romney was serving on the Board of Directors when the decision to stop 
selling pornography was made and, while that decision was likely in line with the religious beliefs of 
the company’s leadership, it was justified on economic grounds. See Elia Gourgouris, Marriott Hotels 
to Drop Pornographic Videos, DESERET NEWS (Feb. 1, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/705365621/Marriott-hotels-to-drop-pornographic-videos.html 
[https://perma.cc/NE7E-L37T] (praising the decision for its religious outcome but not the 
corporation’s economic justification); Yitz Jordan, How Marriott’s Owner Put Aside His Mormon 
Beliefs to Cash in on the LGBT Travel Market, QUARTZ (June 5, 2014), https://qz.com/216328/how-
marriots-owner-put-aside-his-mormon-beliefs-to-cash-in-on-the-lgbt-travel-market/ 
[https://perma.cc/72MZ-69E5]. 
110. For example, the connection between social causes and the bottom line can be seen in the 
history of Subaru’s marketing to, and financial support for, the LGBTQ movement. See Alex 
Mayyasi, How Subarus Came to be Seen as Cars for Lesbians, ATLANTIC (June 22, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/how-subarus-came-to-be-seen-as-cars-for-
lesbians/488042/ [https://perma.cc/7QXE-LJM7] (describing Subaru’s marketing campaign to 
lesbians and their financial support for LGBTQ causes). Likewise, Google has made massive 
investments in renewable energy on the grounds that it is both a socially responsible choice and one 
that provides the company with a financial advantage, both in terms of public relations and new 
market generation. 
111. See Mohapatra, supra note 76, at 180; Pollman, supra note 87, at 170 (“Whereas the pursuit 
of corporate social responsibility often entails questions of whether the board of directors can put 
nonshareholder interests ahead of those of shareholders in order to surpass legal compliance, the 
pursuit of religious accommodation asks the law to bend around the shareholders’ will to avoid 
generally applicable laws.”). 
112. See Matthew T. Bodie, Faith and the Firm, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 609, 619 (2016) (“Rather 
than simply an accommodation of one sincere religious belief, the case came across as one (powerful) 
group trying to impose its religious beliefs on another (less powerful) group. As this played out in the 
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Essentially, the decision retains the shareholders’ right to be self-
interested but gives them even more leeway to use the benefits of the 
corporate form to further non-monetary self-interested pursuits, such as 
exercising their personal religious beliefs.113 These self-interested pursuits 
are not inherently bad; in fact, they can be seen as seeking to advance a 
social good—e.g., protecting the sanctity of marriage, preserving fetal 
life, promoting religious practices. These are certainly issues of public 
import that some socially conscious corporations have sought to 
advance.114 In a culture that values religious freedom and encourages a 
multitude of viewpoints, such corporate activism should not be discounted 
simply because it contradicts many liberal scholars’ personal political 
views.115 
CSR differs from religious exemptions, however, because with CSR 
the corporation is necessarily furthering a social good that is not in conflict 
with the law.116 Corporations are not permitted to substitute their 
judgment about what is best for society by violating the law to further 
what they believe to be a more important social end.117 In contrast, the 
                                                     
Hobby Lobby case, the five members of the Green family used their religious beliefs to defeat a 
regulatory obligation to the 13,000-plus employees at the company.”). 
113. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (describing 
RFRA as providing protection for the individuals to exercise their personal beliefs). In the future such 
exemptions could be expanded to include pursuit of personal artistic expression. Justice Thomas, 
joined by Justice Gorsuch, argued in his concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop that Colorado’s public 
accommodations law as applied to the petitioner violated his right to free exercise and free speech. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1740 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
114. See Rohrlich, supra note 91. The fast food corporation Chick-fil-A discovered that engaging 
in CSR can be problematic when the restaurant chain came under fire for donating to organizations 
that opposed same-sex marriage. While the company has backed away from such politically charged 
topics, the company has retained its corporate purpose “[t]o glorify God by being a faithful steward 
of all that is entrusted to us and to have a positive influence on all who come into contact with Chick-
fil-A” and still closes its stores on Sundays. Hayley Peterson, ‘Chick-fil-A Is About Food’: How 
National Ambitions Led the Chain to Shed Its Polarizing Image, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2017, 7:42 
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/chick-fil-a-reinvents-itself-liberal-conservative-2017-5 
[https://perma.cc/MHN3-VPWE]. 
115. See McDonnell, supra note 37, at 811–12 (arguing that liberals should embrace core values 
of liberty and diversity, including protecting the viewpoints of conservative Christians). 
116. See Wade, supra note 103, at 1189 (“While law compliance is mandated, the quality of that 
compliance is within corporate officers’ discretion.”). 
117. If allowing corporations to substitute their moral judgment for that of society falls within the 
ambit of CSR, the Trump Administration’s rule allowing any company with a religious or moral 
objection to contraception to avoid the requirements of the Affordable Care Act would be a major 
victory for CSR. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive 
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (allowing any corporate entity to claim an 
exemption from the contraceptive mandate on religious grounds); Moral Exemptions and 
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Court in Hobby Lobby did not view the exemption as furthering a public 
good. The Court specifically premised the exemption on the shareholders’ 
right to exercise their personal religion, not on the desired good for society 
that their exercise of religion would create.118 Rather than furthering the 
ability of corporations to advance the interests of other stakeholders, the 
formal recognition by the Court that shareholders may pursue non-profit-
related purposes merely opened the door to claims that the corporate form 
can be used to advance the shareholders’ interest at the expense of other 
stakeholders.119 
Critics of non-mandatory CSR argue that the fatal flaw in the concept 
of corporations voluntarily putting other stakeholder interests over those 
of shareholders is that it actually expands the power of management.120 In 
practice, allowing management to consider corporate purposes other than 
shareholder profit simply frees management from its accountability to the 
only group within the corporation with power over them, namely the 
shareholders.121 By embracing an expansive view of corporate purpose to 
allow for religious exemptions by shareholders, the Court exacerbates this 
flaw by removing the most powerful check on corporate authority outside 
the corporation—regulation by the democratic process.122 
Under the conservative theory of the corporation, for-profit 
corporations are required to “stick to trying to make money within the 
                                                     
Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 
Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 147) (allowing small businesses to claim religious or moral exemptions to the contraceptive 
mandate). 
118. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (holding that the purpose of RFRA as it applies to 
corporations is to protect the shareholder’s sincere religious beliefs). 
119. See id. at 2770–71 (rejecting profit motive as the sole corporate purpose to justify the use of 
the corporation to further shareholders’ religious beliefs); Johnson & Millon, supra note 100, at 22 
(noting that allowing non-financial corporate purposes “was essential to the conclusion in Hobby 
Lobby that business corporations can exercise religion”). 
120. Mandatory CSR does not necessarily suffer from this flaw if other stakeholders are given a 
seat at the table. For example, Germany’s two-tiered boards give labor a say in corporate management. 
See infra note 211. 
121. See A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1365, 1367 (1932) (“Now I submit that you cannot abandon emphasis on ‘the view that business 
corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders’ until such time as you 
are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.”); 
Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 353 (describing concerns that “corporations would be dangerously 
unaccountable if the managers were given broad discretion to pursue diverse ends”). 
122. See Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 356 (noting that corporate law “looks to the political 
process as the legitimate and sound form of protection” for dealing with negative externalities); infra 
Section II.A. 
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‘rules of the game’ set by the government.”123 Rather than changing that 
paradigm to advance interests of stakeholders outside of the corporate 
structure, corporate rights upset the balance established by flexibility for 
private ordering within the corporation tempered by governmental 
regulation of the corporation to limit negative externalities.124 The net 
effect of corporate rights is not just to give corporations heightened ability 
to influence what rules the government creates, but also to allow certain 
shareholders to disregard the rules of the game to further their own 
interests. This gives corporate elites—management who control public 
corporations and the managing shareholders who control private 
corporations—unprecedented power to wield using the corporate form. 
II. STATE LAW AND CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
The inability to curb the power of corporations through external 
regulations is problematic for the balance of power developed over time 
between states and corporations. This balance has evolved to provide 
corporations great freedom within state corporate law to structure the 
internal governance of the corporation, tempered by laws regulating the 
negative externalities made possible by the corporate form. The Court has 
upset that balance not just by the granting of corporate rights that provide 
an avenue to sidestep certain regulatory efforts but also by placing 
pressure on state corporate law to flesh out those rights. The matter is 
complicated by the controversial understandings of state corporate law, 
both explicit and implicit, in the Court’s opinions, leading to an open 
question: how much do states retain of their traditional power to define 
corporations? This Section argues that states should cautiously test their 
power by pushing back against the creeping federalization of state 
corporate law. 
A. State Law Defines a Corporation 
Corporations are creatures of state law.125 Although the federal 
government has the power to charter corporations and create a body of 
federal corporate law, it has largely elected not to do so.126 Instead, states 
                                                     
123. Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 358. 
124. See infra Section II.A. 
125. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 2.50 (rev. vol. 2015) [hereinafter FLETCHER CYC.] (“Modern corporations are creatures of statute, 
deriving their existence and authority to act from the state.”). 
126. Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments 
in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 915–16 (1982) (describing efforts at 
10 - Hardee.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  8:36 PM 
240 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:217 
 
create corporations by granting them charters under the law of the state of 
incorporation.127 State corporate law, in turn, defines the corporations 
chartered by the state, including defining the purpose of the corporation, 
the rules that must be followed in governing the corporation, and which 
rules the parties may alter by contract.128 With the grant of a corporate 
charter, the corporation receives a panoply of benefits that come with the 
corporate form, including perpetual life, limited liability for shareholders, 
the right to hold and transfer property, the right to sue and contract in the 
corporation’s name, and the ability to aggregate and lock capital into the 
corporation.129 The principle underpinning most of these benefits is the 
legal separation between the corporation and the humans associated with 
it.130 
Placing the power to create and define the governing law for 
corporations in the hands of the states naturally results in competition 
between the states for corporate charters and their resulting tax revenue. 
Corporations are free to incorporate in any state or reincorporate in a 
different state if they determine that another state’s corporate law is more 
beneficial.131 The internal affairs doctrine provides that for issues relating 
to the internal governance of the corporation, the law of the state of 
incorporation governs.132 Thus, unlike the residency of a human being, 
choosing a state of citizenship does not require corporations to “live” in 
any sense in the state whose law they choose, making concerns about 
                                                     
federalization, but no result); Pollman, supra note 3, at 646. The federal government has been actively 
involved in securities regulation, which is largely focused on investor protection rather than corporate 
governance, with some limited exceptions. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 653–54. 
127. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 644. 
128. See id. at 650–51. 
129. See id. at 645; Mitchell F. Crusto, Unconscious Classism: Entity Equality for Sole Proprietors, 
11 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 215, 230 (2009) (describing the benefits of the corporate form that 
unincorporated entities lack). 
130. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of 
Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 887 (“A 
business corporation is not simply ‘individual men and women’: it is a distinct entity that is separate 
from its stockholders, managers, and creditors.”); Pollman, supra note 3, at 645 (“These advantages 
were possible because of an essential characteristic of the corporation: it is a distinct legal entity, 
separate from the humans associated with it—the shareholders, directors, employees, and creditors.”). 
131. See Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
965, 966 (1995). 
132. Crespi, supra note 30, at 96. Whether the internal affairs doctrine is merely a matter of comity 
or is constitutionally mandated is a matter of debate, as is the breadth of what should be considered 
an internal governance matter. See infra Section III.C.1. 
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quality of life or regulatory burdens outside of corporate governance 
largely irrelevant.133 
This mobility gives corporations a strong hand to play in terms of 
encouraging states to create corporate law that is responsive to business 
interests. A vigorous academic debate has long raged as to whether this 
competition leads to a “race to the top” or a “race to the bottom” among 
the states.134 Proponents of the “race to the bottom” characterization argue 
that because the real power of a corporation lies with management, 
competition leads to state corporate law favoring managers at the expense 
of shareholder control.135 Critics of this view argue that, in fact, 
competition between states gives investors more options and the rational 
investor will choose to invest in corporations that are chartered in a state 
whose law will allow for the maximization of their investment.136 Thus, 
“permissive corporation law maximizes, rather than minimizes, 
shareholders’ welfare” and state competition leads to a race to the top 
rather than the bottom.137 Notably, for purposes of this Article, both 
theories focus on whether competition creates the best, or worst, 
relationship between management and shareholders. Questions of 
whether state corporate law provides the best protection for parties outside 
the corporate governance structure are largely disregarded when debating 
state corporate law.138 
                                                     
133. See FLETCHER CYC., supra note 127, § 114 (“The domicile or place of creation and existence 
of a foreign corporation is the state of incorporation, although its principal place of business may be 
in the foreign state or states.”). 
134. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663 (1974); Fischel, supra note 126. But see generally Kaouris, supra note 131 (arguing the 
“race” is not really among the states but rather between the states and the threat of federal government 
intervention). 
135. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 134, at 666 (arguing that competition for charters and the resulting 
“modernization” of corporate law has “watered the rights of shareholders vis-à-vis management down 
to a thin gruel”).  
136. See Fischel, supra note 126, at 919. 
137. Id. at 919–20. The benefits to the corporation are not illusory—studies have shown that 
reincorporation in Delaware can result in a higher stock price. See Fischel, supra note 126, at 920–
21; Kaouris, supra note 131, at 981.  
138. See Timothy P. Glynn, Communities and Their Corporations: Towards a Stakeholder 
Conception of the Production of Corporate Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2008) 
(“Manager choice results in the exclusion of other stakeholder interests from corporate law itself—
protection of these interests therefore defaults to market forces and external legal regimes.”); Pollman, 
supra note 3, at 651 (noting that corporate law is “focused on the relationship among shareholders 
and between shareholders and managers” and not “other participants, such as employees and 
creditors”). 
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This was not always the case. The aggregation of power made possible 
by the corporate form has long engendered public concern and mistrust.139 
Initially states attempted to control the power of corporations using 
corporate law.140 At the founding, corporations were available only by 
petition to the state legislature and required the corporation to declare a 
limited corporate purpose.141 By the early 1800s, states had begun to enact 
general incorporation statutes that allowed for incorporation without 
petitioning the legislature, and they were widespread by the 1860s.142 
These statutes were not “liberal incorporation statutes” as we would think 
of them today; they were not available in all industries, and state 
legislatures retained the right “to change or revoke corporate charters at 
will.”143 In addition, several states still maintained restrictions on 
capitalization and purpose.144 Further, during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the ultra vires doctrine provided “a meaningful way 
to limit the power and size of corporations,” by limiting “the authority of 
corporations to the purposes and activities named in the corporate 
charter.”145 
Once the first states enacted what would now be characterized as liberal 
incorporation statutes in the early 1900s, corporations fled to those 
states.146 In reaction to the loss of tax revenue, all states eventually enacted 
                                                     
139. See Donald J. Smythe, The Rise of the Corporation, the Birth of Public Relations, and the 
Foundations of Modern Political Economy, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 635 (2011) (detailing the long history 
of public concerns regarding corporations and the response of the business community to improve the 
corporate image); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Logan (Nov. 12, 1816), in 10 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 521–22 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2013) (“I hope we shall take warning from 
the example and crush in it’s [sic] birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare already 
to challenge our government to a trial of strength, and to bid defiance to the laws of their country.”). 
140. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 646 (noting that “[u]ntil the late nineteenth century, state 
corporate law served as a constraining force on corporate behavior”); Harwell Wells, The Life (and 
Death?) of Corporate Waste, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239, 1244 (2017) (describing nineteenth-
century methods of corporate control, including the ultra vires doctrine). 
141. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 646–47; Strine & Walter, supra note 130, at 897 
(“[C]orporations could do only what their legislatively granted charters empowered them specifically 
to do, acts incidental to those specific powers and nothing else.”). 
142. See Strine & Walter, supra note 130, at 908 (providing historical background on general 
incorporation statutes). 
143. Id. 
144. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 649; Strine & Walter, supra note 130, at 909. 
145. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes 
on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1283 
(2001) (providing a thorough history of the rise, fall, and potential reemergence of the ultra vires 
doctrine). 
146. See Cary, supra note 134, at 663–64. New Jersey was the first to adopt a liberal corporation 
statute, followed by Delaware shortly thereafter. When New Jersey tightened its corporation statute at 
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liberal incorporation statutes,147 allowing corporations to charter for “any 
lawful business or purpose whatever.”148 This move was made to give 
management the ability to “move freely into new business lines and out 
of old ones,” and was not viewed as undermining the for-profit nature of 
the corporation.149 Thus state corporate law evolved from a tool to cabin 
the negative externalities of the corporate form to a permissive framework 
for private ordering within the corporation.150 
Despite the trend towards liberal incorporation, states have not ignored 
the potential harms that can be inflicted by the ability to aggregate wealth 
in the corporate form. These dangers have been largely addressed, 
however, not as a matter of state corporate law, but rather in terms of 
external regulation to protect parties outside the corporate control 
structure.151 Examples of such regulations are abundant, including 
regulations designed to protect employees, customers, and the 
environment.152 States also enacted laws attempting to limit the political 
power of corporations in state elections, though corporate speech rights 
have now abolished that constraint on corporate power.153 
While states have traditionally relied on external regulation to control 
corporations that operate within their state, existing state corporate law 
does not entirely ignore the potential for harm to third parties. Where 
states have created the most mandatory rules for corporate insiders is 
                                                     
the behest of then-Governor Woodrow Wilson, Delaware took the lead in the race for corporations and 
remains the leading state for incorporation. Id. at 664–65; Strine & Walter, supra note 130, at 923. 
147. See Greenfield, supra note 145, at 1311 (noting that competition among the states leads to 
liberal incorporation statutes). 
148. See Strine & Walter, supra note 130 (quoting WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND 
STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 1604 (3d ed. 1984)). 
149. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the 
Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 784, 784 n.90 (2015); see Greenfield, supra note 145, at 1313 (noting 
that the profit maximization rule largely replaced the ultra vires doctrine). 
150. See Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 356 (“Instead of entrusting corporate managers whose 
ultimate right to office depends solely upon election by stockholders to protect other constituencies 
and society from externality risk, conservative corporate theory looks to the political process as the 
legitimate and sound form of protection.”); Pollman, supra note 3, at 654–55 (“The law settled on a 
system in which corporate law governed the internal structure of the corporation and laws outside of 
corporate law provided the primary check on corporate activity.”). 
151. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 655 (describing the “widely acknowledged” division between 
corporate law and “external legal regimes”). 
152. See Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 948, 
951 (2008) (noting that interests outside the power structure of the corporation “are left to depend 
primarily on ‘external’ regulations, such as minimum-wage laws, environmental regulations, and 
consumer safety rules” for protection). 
153. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 615–16; supra Section I.A.1 (discussing corporate speech rights). 
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when the rights of third parties and minority shareholders are affected.154 
For example, all states require corporations to use an entity name that puts 
the public on notice of the corporation’s limited liability status.155 Perhaps 
most importantly, the equitable doctrine of veil piercing was developed 
by state courts to protect corporate creditors from abuses of the privilege 
of limited liability.156 
B. The Creeping Federalization of State Corporate Law 
There is a growing body of scholarship detailing the ways in which 
speech and religious rights for corporations have put pressure on state 
corporate law, potentially upsetting the balance between states and their 
corporate creations.157 The Roberts Court has put pressure on state 
corporate law in two related ways: first, by requiring state law to flesh out 
and implement these new rights and, second, by using (or, arguably, 
misusing) principles of state corporate law to support its holdings. This 
combination makes it clear that states will necessarily play a role in 
defining the rights of corporations, but leaves it unclear which, if any, of 
the Court’s declarations about the nature of state corporate law are 
constitutionally or statutorily mandated. The lack of clarity has the 
potential to lead to a creeping federalization of state corporate law as the 
Supreme Court preempts by implication. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has a long history of granting rights to 
corporations.158 Early cases giving corporations equal protection and due 
process rights in the context of protecting corporate property solidified the 
legal personality of corporations to enter into contracts and protect the 
                                                     
154. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Facilitative and Mandatory Rules in the Corporation Law(s) of the 
United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 252–53 (2002) (describing mandatory rules to protect third 
parties and non-controlling shareholders). 
155. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 202 (West 2019) (requiring “corporation,” “incorporated,” or 
“limited” to appear in corporation’s name); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(1) (2017) (requiring a 
name indicating limited liability status such as “corporation” or “incorporated” unless the corporation 
certifies it has more than $10 million in assets). 
156. See infra Section III.A. 
157. See Buccola, supra note 5; Pollman, supra note 3; David Rosenberg, The Corporate Paradox 
of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 308 (2017) (noting the tension 
between the Hobby Lobby decision and corporate law); Strine & Walter, supra note 4. These rights 
have also created tension with aspects of federal law. See Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with 
Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
125 (2013) (describing tension between corporate rights and personal jurisdiction). 
158. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 
99 (2014) (detailing history of corporate constitutional rights); Pollman, supra note 3, at 658–64. 
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property interests of shareholders.159 These rights were in line with 
important principles of corporate law, such as maintaining the corporation 
as a separate entity, without needing to “rely upon or significantly impact 
state corporate law.”160 
This changed as the Court expanded corporate speech rights into 
speech not necessary to protect corporate property.161 In First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,162 the Court gave corporations the right to make 
political expenditures on ballot measures.163 For the first time, the Court 
implicated the internal control mechanisms of the corporation in its 
holding, stating that the “shareholders may decide, through the procedures 
of corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in 
debate on public issues.”164 The Court pointed to the power to elect 
directors and the ability to bring derivative suits for claims of corporate 
waste as the “procedures” that shareholders can use to guide corporate 
decision-making.165 
The Bellotti holding was cabined to ballot measures until the Court 
revived it in Citizens United, creating a seismic shift in corporate rights 
doctrine.166 In Citizens United, the Court held that the corporation as an 
association of individuals has the right to speak via campaign 
expenditures from the corporation’s general treasury funds.167 The right 
to speak was firmly grounded in the corporation, with the “procedures of 
corporate democracy” once again tapped as the mechanism for 
determining who speaks for the corporation.168 But, as scholars have 
noted, corporate law was designed to “allow for private ordering of 
business ventures,” not to “facilitate the political expression of corporate 
                                                     
159. Pollman, supra note 3, at 658–60 (“Legal personality established by corporate law served the 
important function of providing for a separation of assets and locked in capital that allowed 
corporations to serve as lasting institutions over time.”). 
160. Id. at 660. 
161. See id. at 661–62. 
162. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
163. Id. at 776–78. 
164. Id. at 794. 
165. Id. at 794–95; see Pollman, supra note 3, at 664 (describing the origination of corporate law 
interference in Bellotti). The ability for shareholders to participate in “corporate democracy” are 
largely illusionary in the modern corporation, however, given the prevalence of stock ownership 
through intermediaries. See Strine, supra note 2, at 443–44. 
166. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 664–65; Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 363. 
167. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–319 (2010). 
168. Id. at 361–62 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794); see also Hardee, supra note 46, at 768–69. 
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participants.”169 The opinion thus places strain on state corporate law to 
assume a quasi-constitutional role that is a poor fit.170 
The Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby exacerbated this problem. The 
Court granted the shareholders of certain corporations the statutory right 
under RFRA to exercise their personal religion via the corporation.171 In 
doing so, the Court’s opinion repeatedly runs up against state corporate 
law. Like Citizens United, the Hobby Lobby opinion relies on state law to 
flesh out the contours of this new right. In response to the problem of 
minority shareholders who might disagree with the corporation’s religious 
choice, the Court assigns state corporate law the task of working out any 
such disagreements.172 
The Hobby Lobby decision went a step further by not only turning to 
state law to flesh out corporate rights, but also relying on its own 
controversial definitions of state corporate law to support its holding. The 
most obvious example is the majority’s statement that state corporate law 
does not require corporations to act solely in the pursuit of profit.173 The 
Court’s statement regarding corporate purpose was not mere dicta; it is 
essential to its holding that shareholders may wield the corporate form to 
further any purpose they choose, including exercising their personal 
religion.174 The question of corporate purpose is one that has been, and 
continues to be, vigorously debated by corporate law scholars and state 
courts.175 The Court did not acknowledge this debate with its sweeping 
pronouncement, but rather characterized its finding as settled state law 
across all jurisdictions.176 The goal of this Part is not to settle the debate 
                                                     
169. Pollman, supra note 3, at 667; see also Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 364 (arguing that 
corporate law was designed to allow disinterested shareholders to make profits rather than to express 
shareholders’ “diverse moral and political beliefs”). 
170. Pollman, supra note 3, at 665. 
171. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014); Hardee, supra 
note 44, at 771–73 (describing holding in detail); Gregory A. Mark, Hobby Lobby and Corporate 
Personhood: Taking the U.S. Supreme Court’s Reasoning at Face Value, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 535, 
541 (2016) (noting that the decision protects the shareholders’ right to exercise religion). 
172. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774–75. Corporate law does not present an easy answer. See infra 
notes 188–193 and accompanying text. 
173. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (“While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-
profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations 
to pursue profit at the expense of everything else.”). 
174. Id. (“If for-profit corporations may pursue [non-monetary social] objectives, there is no 
apparent reason why they may not further religious objectives as well.”). 
175. See supra Section I.B. 
176. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771. The Court’s language regarding corporate purpose can be 
read narrowly as limited only to circumstances where all shareholders of a closely held corporation 
are in agreement to put aside profit in favor of a religious purpose. See id. (stating that corporations 
can pursue other purposes “[s]o long as its owners agree” and “with ownership approval”); 
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regarding corporate purpose for all fifty states, or to suggest that all 
jurisdictions would even come to the same conclusion, but rather to note 
where the Court’s reasoning runs into conflict with some views of existing 
state laws regarding corporate purpose. This conflict indicates that at least 
some states may wish to challenge the Court’s assertion of corporate 
purpose.177 
The Court points to inconclusive evidence to challenge the idea of 
profit maximization. The fact that many companies exceed environmental 
standards or make charitable donations fits comfortably within the view 
of either conservative corporate theory or CSR, so long as the board can 
justify them as beneficial to the long-term financial interests of 
shareholders.178 The Court also references the trend toward enacting 
statutes for the creation of benefit corporations—corporations with mixed 
profit and socially beneficial purposes—as evidence that states allow 
socially conscious corporations.179 The reference is somewhat puzzling as 
the existence of a separate incorporation statute for corporations with a 
mixed purpose suggests that general incorporation statutes do not provide 
that option.180 
In addition, benefit corporation statutes require benefit corporations to 
place a social purpose above shareholders’ financial interests.181 These are 
                                                     
McDonnell, supra note 37, at 805 (noting that the Court’s language might suggest the “weaker 
conception” of stakeholder involvement where shareholder approval is required). Given that there is 
no cause for litigation when shareholders agree, there is scant evidence of what states consider to be 
the limits of corporate purpose in such circumstances. 
177. For example, Chief Justice Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court has argued forcefully that 
the purpose of Delaware for-profit corporations is shareholder profit maximization. See Strine, supra 
note 2, at 440–41; Strine, supra note 4, at 107–08; Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 346–51. 
178. See supra notes 107–110 and accompanying text. By allowing shareholders to put their 
personal interests above the interests of other stakeholders, such as employees, the Hobby Lobby 
decision is arguably not in line with CSR. See supra notes 111–112. 
179. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771. 
180. See Strine, supra note 4, at 107. In addition, none of the corporations at issue are incorporated 
under a benefit corporation statute. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764 (“Conestoga is organized 
under Pennsylvania law as a for-profit corporation.”); id. at 2765 (noting that both Hobby Lobby and 
Mardel are for-profit corporations under Oklahoma law). 
181. See FLETCHER CYC., supra note 125, § 70.50 (“A benefit corporation (B corporation) is a new 
class of corporation that uses the corporate form to solve social and environmental problems. . . . It’s 
[sic] purpose is to create a positive impact on society and the environment, even if it sacrifices profit 
to do so.”). California’s Benefit Corporation statute provides that “[a] benefit corporation shall have 
the purpose of creating general public benefit.” CAL. CORP. CODE § 14610 (West 2019). “General 
public benefit” is defined as “a material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a 
whole, as assessed against a third-party standard.” Id. § 14601(c). Specific benefits may be defined 
in the charter, including benefits to third parties such as providing low-income services or 
“[p]romoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge,” with a catch-all category for “[t]he 
accomplishment of any other particular benefit for society or the environment.” Id. § 14601(e). 
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similar to constituency statutes, which specifically allow for-profit 
corporations incorporated under general incorporation statutes to consider 
non-shareholder interests in making corporate decisions.182 Both can be 
interpreted as undercutting the shareholder maximization principle by 
requiring or permitting corporations to place the interests of non-
shareholders over shareholder profit.183 The fact that states are willing to 
allow shareholders to use the corporate form to benefit third parties over 
personal profit does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the 
corporate form provides more leeway to shareholders to use the corporate 
form to further their own personal interests at the expense of third 
parties.184 
The benefit corporation and constituency statutes demonstrate the 
difficulty with the Court’s statement regarding corporate purpose. It is one 
thing to say that corporations may (or must) consider the interests of 
people other than shareholders when wielding the power of the corporate 
form. Such a statement is in line with concerns that self-interested 
shareholders will lead to the power of the corporate form being used to 
the detriment of those outside the corporate power structure.185 It is 
another thing to argue that states allow those within the corporate power 
structure to wield the benefits of incorporation for any personal ends they 
choose, even at the expense of other stakeholders. Such an argument 
broadens, rather than limits, the ability of shareholders to use the 
                                                     
182. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. 
REV. 971, 986 (1992) (defining the basic model of non-shareholder constituency statutes as providing 
“that in discharging their duty of care, directors may consider the effects of a decision on not only 
shareholders, but also on a list of other constituency groups”). Unlike benefit corporations, which were 
created to advance CSR, constituency statutes arose as anti-takeover protection for management. Id. 
183. See Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the 
Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 634 (2007) (“[S]hareholder constituency statutes have opened the door to 
allow directors of public companies to take non-shareholder interests and concerns into consideration 
when making investment decisions.”); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social 
Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 25 (2012) 
(noting that benefit corporations attack the shareholder wealth maximization principle while also 
noting they allow management more discretion than constituency statutes). 
184. See Murray, supra note 183, at 28 (arguing that guidance and oversight is necessary to avoid 
having directors of benefit corporations to “default to seeking their own self-interest or their own 
objectives”); Pollman, Corporate Law, supra note 87, at 170. 
185. See Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on 
Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit 
Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 642 (2013) (noting the increased call for socially 
conscious corporations who “consider stakeholder interests and embrace socially and 
environmentally responsible business models” over shareholder wealth maximization); Daniel J. 
Morrissey, The Riddle of Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 
353, 387 (2015) (same). 
10 - Hardee.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  8:36 PM 
2019] VEIL PIERCING AND THE POWER OF STATE COURTS 249 
 
corporate form in their own self-interest.186 It is questionable whether 
states intended the benefits of the corporate form, especially limited 
liability, to be used by shareholders for their purely personal, non-
economic, ends.187 
The denouncement of the shareholder maximization principle is also 
problematic in relation to the Court’s tasking of state corporate law to 
determine the rights of minority shareholders in determining the 
corporation’s religion.188 The opinion states that in resolving disputes 
regarding the corporation’s religion, courts should look to the 
corporation’s management structure and “underlying state law in 
resolving disputes.”189 In resolving intracorporate disputes, however, 
states have relied on the profit maximization principle to settle conflicts 
between shareholders when a majority shareholder wishes to put a 
personal or social goal over profits.190 When the majority shareholder 
professes to be seeking to further some other goal at the expense of profits, 
states have stepped in to protect the minority shareholder based on the 
grounds that in taking the corporate form, controlling shareholders have a 
duty to put the corporate profit ahead of other interests.191 
The Hobby Lobby opinion thus creates a paradox. If a majority 
shareholder states that she is claiming a RFRA exemption to maximize 
the profits of the corporation, she does not violate state corporate law and 
the minority shareholder has no claim against her. But in alleging a profit 
motive, she has disqualified herself from claiming a religious exemption, 
                                                     
186. See Mohapatra, supra note 76, at 180–81 (noting that contraceptive mandate was 
determination by Congress that socially responsible corporations must provide contraceptive 
coverage and Hobby Lobby allowed shareholders’ personal beliefs to nullify that right); Pollman, 
Corporate Law, supra note 87, at 170. 
187. The veil piercing doctrine generally makes limited liability unavailable to shareholders who 
use the corporation’s assets for their own personal use. See infra Section III.A. 
188. The fact that the Court recognized the possibility that there could be conflict over the decision 
to claim a RFRA exemption suggests that its rejection of the shareholder maximization principle is 
not limited to only corporations where shareholders unanimously agree to adopt a corporate religion. 
189. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014). 
190. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding 
controlling shareholders cannot put social goals over profit for minority shareholder in a for profit 
corporation); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (same); see also D. Gordon 
Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 318–21 (1998) (demonstrating that the 
shareholder primacy norm arose out of minority oppression cases). Professor Smith argues that the 
shareholder primacy norm is largely irrelevant under modern law and such issues should be 
considered under the doctrine of minority oppression. Id. at 322–23. He notes that whether a change 
in doctrine will lead to different outcomes is up for debate. Id. at 321. 
191. See Newmark, 16 A.3d at 34 (“The corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is 
not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders 
interested in realizing a return on their investment.”). 
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as the Hobby Lobby decision makes it clear that any exemption must be 
motivated by the sincere religious beliefs of the shareholders.192 If, on the 
other hand, the majority shareholder claims that the exemption is 
motivated by her sincere religious belief and not profit, then she is 
permitted to claim the RFRA exemption but may run afoul of state 
corporate law, possibly giving the minority shareholder a claim against 
her.193 
The Court’s holding in Hobby Lobby also conflicts with the separation 
required between the corporation and its shareholders. Legal separation 
between shareholders and the corporation is the foundational principle of 
corporate law.194 The legal existence of the corporation, distinct from its 
shareholders, forms the basis for the benefits that flow from entity status, 
such as perpetual life, the ability to contract in the corporation’s name, 
and, most importantly, limited liability for shareholders.195 The Court’s 
opinion breaks down this separation by looking through the corporate 
entity to reach the personal rights of the shareholders.196 Corporations 
qualify for a RFRA exemption only if the corporation’s shareholders can 
claim a unity of interest with the corporation such that their personal 
religious beliefs can infuse the corporation with their religion.197 
                                                     
192. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (basing its decision on the sincerity of the shareholders’ 
religious beliefs). 
193. See Robert M. Ackerman & Lance Cole, Making Corporate Law More Communitarian: A 
Proposed Response to the Roberts Court’s Personification of Corporations, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 895, 
962–63 (2016) (arguing that it is “hard to imagine” that RFRA would allow a controlling shareholder 
to elevate their personal religious beliefs over the rights of the minority shareholders “in contravention 
of the controlling shareholders’ fiduciary obligations”). The Hobby Lobby opinion can thus only be 
reconciled with all states’ corporate law if the Court’s language regarding corporate purpose is taken 
to mean that corporations with unanimous shareholder agreement may claim any shareholder purpose, 
but shareholders who are not in agreement are limited to solely profit motives. As noted, the accuracy 
of allowing expanded shareholder purposes, even with unanimity, is not without doubt under state 
law. See supra Section II.B. 
194. See KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT) 
10 (2018) (“[I]t is not an overstatement to say that corporate separateness has been one of the most 
important legal innovations in the development of national wealth.”); Elizabeth Pollman, 
Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1638–39; Sepper, Contraception, 
supra note 67, at 318 (“The very goal of the corporate form is to separate the person from the entity, 
shielding the person from obligation and liability and ensuring that the entity focuses on profit 
maximization.”). 
195. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 
14, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 
333889, at *6–10 [hereinafter Corporate Law Professors’ Brief]; Greenfield, supra note 145, at 314. 
196. The Court held that “[a] corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to 
achieve desired ends” and that “protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations . . . protects the 
religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
197. Id. at 2774 (limiting holding to companies where owners share sincere religious beliefs). 
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Numerous scholars have argued that such a holding violates basic 
principles of state corporate law.198 
In light of these U.S. Supreme Court decisions, states are faced with 
several unanswered questions that threaten to undermine the principles of 
federalism that have been the hallmark of state corporate law. While it is 
clear that state law must flesh out corporate rights, must they do so in a 
way that furthers the corporate right at issue?199 Other questions are raised 
regarding the Court’s use of controversial descriptions of state corporate 
law: are states required to utilize the Court’s definition, even if 
corporations are not constituted in such a way under their law? Even if the 
Court accurately characterized state law as it existed at the time of the 
decision, do states retain their historic power to alter corporate law to 
adapt to new circumstances?200 These questions speak to the heart of a 
state’s power to define the acceptable uses of the corporate form. 
In responding to these questions, states will be faced with policy 
decisions regarding the balance of power within a corporation that take on 
new import given the now quasi-constitutional implications of corporate 
governance. State corporate law was designed to provide flexibility to 
corporate insiders, not to protect the ability of shareholders to exercise 
their constitutional rights through the corporation.201 Likewise, protecting 
the rights of third parties and the integrity of the political system was taken 
out of the ambit of corporate governance and largely entrusted to external 
regulation.202 If such regulations are no longer constitutionally permitted, 
states must find new ways (or return to their old ways) to contend with the 
unleashed power of the corporate form. 
                                                     
198. Before the Court’s decision, corporate scholars urged the Court to reject an alter ego view of 
the corporation that would weaken the separation requirement. See Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, 
supra note 195 (arguing against allowing RFRA exemptions on corporate law grounds); Greenfield, 
supra note 145, at 1313–14; Sepper, Contraception, supra note 67, at 318–19. After the Court’s 
decision, many prominent corporate scholars have decried the decision as fundamentally at odds with 
the principle of a separate corporate entity. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 193, at 948; Mark, 
supra note 171, at 540; Pollman, Corporate Law, supra note 87, at 157; Thomas E. Rutledge, A 
Corporation Has No Soul—the Business Entity Law Response to Challenges to the PPACA 
Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2014). 
199. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 3, at 686–87 (discussing open questions regarding application 
of corporate religious rights). 
200. See, e.g., Buccola, supra note 5, at 621–22 (exploring whether states may change status quo 
to adapt to corporate speech rights). 
201. See supra Section II.A. 
202. See supra Section II.A. 
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C. Pushing Back, but with Caution 
Given the shift in the foundation of state corporate law created by 
granting corporations personal rights, states may decide that some 
reconceptualization of the architecture of corporate law is in order.203 
Because the Court has been unclear about what areas of state law it is 
preempting, however, it is difficult to know how much states can push 
back.204 For constitutional law scholars, these issues may appear clear cut. 
When the Constitution gives a right to a natural born person, it is 
axiomatic that the state cannot try to redefine what it means to be a 
“person.”205 Corporations, however, are different.206 
What a corporation is is not a matter of natural law or biology; it 
necessarily depends on how a corporation is defined by the state.207 A state 
may create corporations that lack the power to engage in certain 
behaviors, even if those behaviors arguably implicate constitutional 
rights.208 Historically this line was policed more vigorously by the states 
with limited corporate purposes, the ultra vires doctrine, and stricter 
requirements regarding corporate structure.209 While the trend has been to 
provide shareholders and management more leeway in terms of corporate 
purpose and structure, that is not a requirement.210 
                                                     
203. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 599 (arguing that although “states cannot overrule the Court’s 
understanding of corporate rights” they can “disempower the corporations they create from doing the 
kinds of things that implicate disfavored federal rights”). 
204. See id. at 616–17 (noting that the Court’s corporate speech cases create uncertainty regarding 
whether states retain “their historical authority over domestic corporations”). 
205. Id. at 600 (noting that most rights cases involve questions of individuals who undoubtedly 
have the “power to act contrary to the regulation”). 
206. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 16, at 86 (“A corporation, after all, is not a natural, 
Platonic entity. It is a legal arrangement, and its internal allocation of authority is a product of legal 
rules.”); Buccola, supra note 5, at 600 (describing corporations as requiring positive law to establish 
their capacities to act). 
207. This is meant in the weak sense that whether a corporation has the power to engage in an 
activity or what procedures are required by corporate governance law to authorize certain activities is 
a matter of state law. It is not meant to state a position in the debate over corporate personhood and 
the epistemological nature of a corporation. 
208. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 599. Professor Buccola gives the “trivial yet telling example” 
that Delaware law forbids the issuing of “honorary degrees” by corporations without approval by the 
Secretary of Education. Id. It is likely that individuals would have a protected First Amendment right 
to express approval of someone by conferring such an honor, while it seems unlikely that the First 
Amendment would require that corporations be empowered to do so. Id. 
209. See supra notes 139–145 and accompanying text. 
210. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 610 (finding that the states did not lose their authority to limit 
corporate power, “they simply ceased to exercise it”). 
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Corporate purpose and structure can be dictated in myriad ways, 
including by requiring other stakeholders or members of the broader 
community to have a binding say in corporate governance.211 The Court 
implicitly recognized this fact by acknowledging that state corporate law 
will determine how corporate rights can be exercised.212 It remains an 
open question, however, whether states must respond in a way that merely 
incorporates these new rights into the existing rules regarding 
corporations or whether states retain the power to rethink the rules in light 
of the new weight put on corporate governance. 
Scholars are beginning to suggest ways that states can adapt corporate 
law in light of these new rights.213 For example, in Citizens United, the 
Court noted that the “procedures of corporate democracy” determine who 
speaks for the corporation.214 Traditionally, the board of directors makes 
such decisions about the management of the corporation, including 
corporate expenditures, without shareholder approval.215 Scholars have 
suggested that states could create a requirement that shareholders be given 
                                                     
211. For example, in Germany employees make up half of the supervisory board, leading to true 
codetermination by statutory mandate. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory 
Management: An Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1054 (1998) (comparing 
American and German efforts at participatory management). German boards also often include 
representatives of banks or other businesses who represent a constituency with a relationship to the 
company. Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 99 
(2007). California became the first state to attempt such corporate engineering by enacting a law 
requiring any corporation headquartered in the state to have a minimum amount of gender diversity. 
See Sophia Bollag, California Just Became the First State to Require Women on Corporate Boards. 
Here’s What You Need to Know, MONEY (Oct. 1, 2018), http://time.com/money/5411416/california-
women-corporate-boards/ [https://perma.cc/MGT8-D3W7]. 
212. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (“State 
corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts [about the corporation’s religion] 
by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure.”); Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010) (noting that the “procedures of corporate democracy” will 
determine corporate speech). 
213. See, e.g., Ackerman & Cole, supra note 193 (making statutory proposals to curb the effects of 
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 16 (outlining proposals to give 
shareholders a role in the decision to make political expenditures); Buccola, supra note 5 (outlining 
the power of states to define corporate law despite the Court’s incursions). While not directly making 
a state law proposal, Professor Bodie argues that a corporation should only have a right to exercise 
religion if the employees have a say in its adoption. See Bodie, supra note 112, at 618–21. 
214. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 794 (1978)). 
215. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 16, at 87 (describing corporate governance rules relating 
to the decision to engage in political speech); Rosenberg, supra note 157, at 312 (noting that under 
existing corporate law, the decision to spend money is an everyday business decision and thus under 
the power of the board). 
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a say on corporate political expenditures.216 As a practical matter, 
shareholder votes are expensive and would draw attention to any 
campaign spending, thus voting requirements would likely hamper the 
exercise of political speech by corporations.217 
Although states should seek to rebalance the power corporations can 
exert within their territory, it is important not to throw the proverbial baby 
out with the bathwater. The genius of the modern corporation is the 
enabling of private ordering to achieve economic efficiencies. Dramatic 
changes to that system could lead to unintended consequences. The 
prospect of corporate flight raises another limitation to proposals 
regarding state corporate law: the internal affairs doctrine.218 For a 
proposal to actually protect its citizens, a state would need to disregard 
the internal affairs doctrine and apply their own law to foreign 
corporations.219 Disregarding the internal affairs doctrine, especially for 
core internal governance issues like shareholder voting, raises 
constitutional concerns of its own.220 Perhaps more importantly, it leads 
to practical problems as corporations may be subject to inconsistent 
governance requirements from multiple states.221 
This Article suggests that while states should push back, the best 
response—at least initially—may be a tentative one.222 States should turn 
to the courts to enforce those aspects of corporate common law that 
provide balance between corporate power and its impact on third parties. 
Utilizing an existing common law doctrine already in service of protecting 
parties outside the corporation from the state-sanctioned power of the 
                                                     
216. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 16 (outlining proposals to give shareholders a role in the 
decision to make political expenditures); Taub, supra note 89, at 426–27 (proposing limiting 
corporate speech rights to only those corporations that qualify for the Hobby Lobby exemptions, 
including shareholder agreement). 
217. See Greenwood, supra note 46, at 1037 (noting that shareholder elections are “enormously 
expensive” but are largely predetermined in favor of management). 
218. See supra Section II.A. 
219. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 635–36. Professor Buccola also notes that host states can protect 
their citizens by refusing to recognize corporations chartered in other states if they do not meet the 
requirements of the host state. Id. at 644.  
220. See id. at 638–40 (describing the debate over whether the internal affairs doctrine is 
constitutionally mandated).  
221. Despite this concern, both California and New York have passed outreach statutes that 
regulate at least some of the internal affairs of corporations with strong ties to the state. CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 2115 (West 2019); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1301–20 (McKinney 2018). 
222. Depending on the response from the federal bench to initial attempts to modify existing state 
law, a dramatic rethinking of corporate law may be required, but it is not clear that such revolutionary 
action is necessary yet. Cf. Ackerman & Cole, supra note 193, at 1000–01 (arguing for mandatory 
constituency statutes that would adopt a communitarian model of the corporation). 
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corporation would make a good start. An ideal candidate would involve 
parties outside the corporation to provide the strongest basis for 
disregarding the internal affairs doctrine. The doctrine of veil piercing 
provides just such a test case. While utilizing the veil piercing doctrine in 
such a way is not without its challenges, at the very least it will force the 
Court to be transparent about the lengths to which it intends to federalize 
state corporate law in the name of corporate rights. 
III. RETHINKING LIMITED LIABILITY AND VEIL PIERCING 
The protection of shareholders’ personal assets from corporate debts is 
a hallmark of the corporate form. But limited liability is not unlimited. 
Courts will pierce the corporate veil to allow creditors to reach 
shareholders’ personal assets in cases where the shareholder has abused 
the corporate form or used the corporation for personal ends.223 The 
Supreme Court’s corporate rights decisions implicate both the separation 
requirement and corporate purpose, making adaptations to the veil 
piercing doctrine a doctrinally justifiable response. While there will likely 
be pushback against state attempts to minimize the impact of corporate 
rights, there are several practical reasons why changes to the veil piercing 
doctrine enacted through the common law puts states in the best position 
to respond to challenges. 
A. Limited Liability and Veil Piercing 
Limited liability is generally regarded as the most important benefit 
provided by the corporate form.224 Limited liability prevents creditors 
from reaching the personal assets of corporate shareholders to pay the 
debts of the corporation unless the shareholder is personally liable for the 
debt.225 Shareholders are only liable for debts that they personally 
                                                     
223. See Carol Goforth, A Corporation Has No Soul, and Doesn’t Go to Church: Relating the 
Doctrine of Piercing the Veil to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 67 S.C. L. REV. 73, 86–87 (2015). 
224. See Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 195, at 6; Daniel J. Morrissey, Piercing All 
the Veils: Applying an Established Doctrine to a New Business Order, 32 J. CORP. L. 529, 536 (2007) 
(“Limited liability is considered the most important aspect of a corporation . . . .”). 
225. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (2017) (providing that “the stockholders of a 
corporation shall not be personally liable for the payment of the corporation’s debts except as they 
may be liable by reason of their own conduct or acts”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2016) (“A shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for any liabilities of the 
corporation (including liabilities arising from acts of the corporation) except (i) to the extent provided 
in a provision of the articles of incorporation permitted by section 2.02(b)(2)(v), and (ii) that a 
shareholder may become personally liable by reason of the shareholder’s own acts or conduct.”); see 
also Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE 
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guarantee or for torts that they commit in their personal capacity.226 This 
allows the corporation to incur sizeable liability in both contract and tort 
while shareholders “only stand to lose their initial investments in the 
business. The rest of their personal assets will be safe.”227 
Limited liability is a radical departure from the traditional forms of 
business—general partnerships and sole proprietorships—that were used 
for nearly all business prior to the end of the nineteenth century.228 Under 
such forms, business owners were treated as having a unity of identity 
with their business and thus were personally responsible for the debts of 
the business.229 Personal liability was justified on the grounds that 
business owners reaped the profits of the business enterprise and generally 
exercised control over the business and therefore should be held liable for 
its debts.230 
Numerous justifications have been offered in support of altering this 
baseline rule that those who profit from a business are responsible for its 
debts.231 First and foremost, limited liability is justified on the grounds 
that, unlike general partnerships or sole proprietorships, a corporation has 
                                                     
FOREST L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (“All state corporate statutes provide shareholders limited liability either 
explicitly or implicitly.”). 
226. See Morrissey, supra note 224, at 536; Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: 
Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 10 (1994) (noting direct liability for “tort, crime, or regulatory actions” taken by shareholders 
in their personal capacity). 
227. Morrissey, supra note 224, at 537. 
228. See Hardee, supra note 44, at 12–13 (describing history of unincorporated forms); Gregory A. 
Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1441, 1443–44 (1987); Thompson, supra note 226, at 9 (noting that limited liability did not 
become the standard until the middle of the nineteenth century). 
229. See Hardee, supra note 44, at 11–12 (describing relationship between partners and sole 
proprietors and their business entities); Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism 
and Functionalism in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REV. 395, 396–97 (describing partnerships as 
people conducting business with “jointly owned property and jointly incurred obligations”). 
230. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1171 
(1989) (comparing closely held corporations with active shareholders and general partnerships, 
concluding that “the issue of control is crucial in determining the appropriateness and legitimacy of 
limited liability”); Morrissey, supra note 224, at 536 (describing conceptual difference between 
partnerships and corporations with respect to limited liability). 
231. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (1985) (arguing that limited liability exists to “facilitate[] the corporate 
form of organization” and lower transaction costs); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: 
Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
1387, 1394–95 (1992) (critiquing traditional justifications of limited liability through a feminist lens); 
Mitchell, supra note 230, at 1147 (focusing on limited liability driven by judicial decisions and as a 
result of separation of control and ownership). It would be impossible to cover all the proffered 
justifications for limited liability in this Article and thus the focus is on the rationales that relate most 
closely to veil piercing and corporate purpose as relates to corporate rights. See infra Section III.B.1. 
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its own legal existence “separate and apart from its shareholders.”232 This 
legal separation provides the conceptual basis for treating corporate debt 
as distinct from personal debt.233 Separation is most cleanly observed in 
corporations where shareholders are passive investors with little control, 
making it “unfair to hold shareholders accountable for [corporate] 
obligations.”234 However, shareholders are not required to remain passive 
for limited liability to apply, so long as corporate debts are not a result of 
their personal conduct.235 
Strong economic rationales also support the concept of limited liability. 
It is no coincidence that widespread limited liability in the corporate form 
arose during the Industrial Revolution.236 In order to amass the capital 
necessary for substantial building projects, investors needed a way to 
invest without the burden of actively monitoring the management of each 
entity to protect their personal assets.237 Limited liability provided the 
solution. It allowed investors to diversify their holdings by removing the 
threat of personal liability.238 It also democratized investment by giving 
less wealthy individuals the ability to access the capital markets without 
                                                     
232. Morrissey, supra note 224, at 536; accord Gabaldon, supra note 231, at 1394–95 (discussing 
the “perception that unlimited liability is the natural consequence of carrying on a business and limited 
liability is a special benefit conferred in exchange for the expense and constraints of the corporate 
format”); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 231, at 89 (arguing that under the nexus of 
contract theory, limited liability exists because the corporation is not “real” and thus shareholders are 
only liable for the amounts they invest). 
233. See Gabaldon, supra note 231, at 1396 (noting that early American courts found limited 
liability based on the “separate juridical stature of the corporation”). 
234. Morrissey, supra note 224, at 537; see also Thompson, supra note 225, at 10 (noting that veil 
piercing is very rarely successful against passive investors in a corporation). 
235. See supra notes 225–226. 
236. See Smythe, supra note 139, at 645 (describing the economic changes of the Second Industrial 
Revolution that were facilitated by corporate law); Jeffrey K. Vandervoort, Piercing the Veil of 
Limited Liability Companies: The Need for a Better Standard, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 51, 53–
54 (2004) (describing limited liability as helping fuel the Industrial Revolution). But see Mitchell, 
supra note 230, at 1165–67 (noting that the history of limited liability is “inconclusive” and that 
limited liability may not have been a primary driver of industrialization).  
237. See Morrissey, supra note 224, at 537–38 (stating that limited liability alleviates the need for 
shareholders to avoid the need to actively monitor management); Smythe, supra note 139, at 645 
(noting the increased capital needs of the Second Industrial Revolution). Limited liability thus allows 
for efficient capital markets by relieving shareholders of the need to “assess[] the value of [their] 
potential shares vis-à-vis those of every other stockholder.” Morrissey, supra note 224, at 539. 
238. See Henry Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 
262 (1967) (noting that personal liability would prevent diversification by wealthy investors); 
Vandervoort, supra note 236, at 54 (“With limited liability, owners are set free to invest in various 
business ventures without the need to incur the excessive costs necessary to monitor each enterprise 
closely.”). 
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shouldering monitoring costs.239 Such justifications do not necessarily 
apply to closely held corporations, especially because creditors of small 
corporations will frequently require debts to be personally guaranteed.240 
However, limited liability arguably promotes entrepreneurship by 
limiting the risk to small business owners’ personal assets.241 
While there are many reasons why limited liability has flourished, it is 
not without its costs. The risk of corporate debt is not magically whisked 
away by the corporate form. Limited liability simply takes the economic 
risk off the backs of entrepreneurs and investors and places it on creditors 
and tort victims.242 Thus, corporate shareholders enjoy the profits of the 
business enterprise while passing a significant share of its risks onto 
others. Externalizing risks in such a way creates a moral hazard as 
entrepreneurs are incentivized to take outsized risks because they do not 
bear the full loss.243 Given these costs, limited liability can be seen as a 
“trade-off” society makes in order to “encourage economic expansion.”244 
Limited liability is not an absolute privilege, however. If shareholders 
are found to have abused the corporate form, the doctrine of veil piercing 
allows the court to “pierce” the limited liability shield of the corporation 
to allow corporate creditors to recover from the shareholders’ personal 
assets.245 Veil piercing is an equitable remedy developed under the 
common law to avoid injustice created by limited liability.246 It occurs 
                                                     
239. See Stephen V. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, “Single Business Enterprise,” “Alter Ego,” 
and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and Shareholder Limited Liability: Back 
Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 405, 408–
09 (2006) (stating that limited liability allowed diversification of the ownership of corporations, thus 
spreading wealth among the community); Vandervoort, supra note 236, at 55 (noting that limited 
liability allows those who cannot afford monitoring costs access to capital markets). 
240. See Morrissey, supra note 224, at 540 (noting that limited liability for small companies may 
make little difference for contract claims, but not for tort claims). 
241. But see Mitchell, supra note 230, at 1172 (arguing that “limited liability makes little, if any, 
difference in the decision of small businesspersons to incorporate”). 
242. Morrissey, supra note 224, at 535; see also Gabaldon, supra note 231, at 1429 (“Limiting 
liability is about imposing risks that someone else must bear.”). 
243. See Morrissey, supra note 224, at 540 (noting limited liability in closely held corporations can 
“allow the owners to unfairly externalize the costs of their enterprise”); Thompson, supra note 226, 
at 14 (explaining that limited liability may create incentives to engage in hazardous activities or fail 
to make safety investments). 
244. See Morrissey, supra note 224, at 535. Limited liability is such a success that it has been 
expanded into other forms, including the Limited Liability Company and the Limited Liability 
Partnership. See Vandervoort, supra note 236, at 63–64. 
245. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 1–12 (2018); Robert B. Thompson, 
Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991). 
246. See Morrissey, supra note 224, at 541 (noting that veil piercing is an equitable remedy 
developed under the common law); Thompson, supra note 245, at 1041 (“Resolution of a piercing 
question is almost always left to a judge’s determination of corporate illegitimacy.”); cf. Alexander 
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when a court determines that the corporate shield ought to be disregarded, 
or pierced, because “the debt in question is not really a debt of the 
corporation, but ought, in fairness, to be viewed as a debt of the individual 
or corporate shareholder or shareholders.”247 Courts are likely to pierce 
when “the owners are using the business in such a way as to advance only 
their personal interests rather than the corporation’s legal interests.”248 
A noted scholar and empiricist found that “piercing the corporate veil 
is the most litigated issue in corporate law.”249 Despite its prevalence, 
scholars frequently bemoan the lack of uniformity and clarity in the 
doctrine.250 The vagaries or, more charitably, the flexibility of veil 
piercing cases may simply be a side effect of the “discretion necessarily 
inherent in equitable jurisprudence,” or the ambiguity may be necessary 
to prevent giving corporations a “road map for fraud.”251 A leading treatise 
on veil piercing posits that “the doctrine is never likely to be pinned down 
to rigid particulars, and that it will evolve and change as long as our 
conception of, and our goals for, the corporation remain changing.”252 
Thus, “[a]s long as our theories of the corporation are changing,” the 
doctrine will continue to evolve.253 Although the exact contours of veil 
piercing are difficult to pin down, even critics of the doctrine concede that 
the body of cases “may be understood, at least roughly, as attempts to 
balance the benefits of limited liability against its costs.”254 
While pinning down a definitive test across jurisdictions is impossible, 
most veil piercing cases require a showing that a corporation was an “alter 
ego” or “mere instrumentality” of the shareholder.255 Extensive empirical 
                                                     
v. Abbey of the Chimes, 163 Cal. Rptr. 377, 381 (Ct. App. 1980) (“When considering the application 
of the alter ego doctrine to a particular situation, it must be remembered that it is an equitable doctrine 
and, though courts have justified its application through consideration of many factors, their basic 
motivation is to assure a just and equitable result.” (citation omitted)). 
247. PRESSER, supra note 245, at 8 (citation omitted). 
248. Goforth, supra note 223, at 86–87; see also Morrissey, supra note 224, at 544–46 (expressing 
veil piercing at its essence as “courts seem to be saying, if you fail to act like a corporation . . . we 
won’t afford your owners limited liability, which is the principle privilege of [the corporation’s] 
artificial existence”). 
249. Thompson, supra note 245, at 1036. 
250. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 230, at 1169 (“The circumstances under which [veil piercing] 
will occur are unclear; the tests that courts apply in deciding whether to disregard the corporate fiction 
richly reflect judicial ambivalence.”); Morrissey, supra note 224, at 542 (noting that “the piercing 
doctrine has been widely disparaged as a confusing anomaly”). 
251. Morrissey, supra note 224, at 543. 
252. PRESSER, supra note 245, at 12. 
253. Id. 
254. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 231, at 109. 
255. Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 84 (2010). 
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work has found a set of common factors that courts frequently consider 
when determining whether the shareholder is an alter ego of the 
corporation such as commingling of funds, control or domination by the 
shareholder, fraud or misrepresentation, inadequate capitalization, and 
injustice or unfairness.256 Commingling occurs when a shareholder fails 
to maintain the corporation as a separate business unit by “us[ing] 
corporate funds for personal purposes, mix[ing] corporate and personal 
accounts, or commingl[ing] assets so that the ownership interests [are] 
indistinguishable.”257 The factor of control or domination by the 
shareholder requires more than just a shareholder who runs the 
corporation and profits from it.258 Rather, it requires a showing that a 
shareholder or shareholders so dominate the affairs of the corporation that 
there is no separation between the two.259 
Many states have incorporated these factors into a two-part test. For 
example, California is typical in this approach where veil piercing 
requires: “(1) that there be such unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist 
and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an 
inequitable result will follow.”260 The ultimate question in the veil 
piercing analysis is to determine whether maintaining the separate 
                                                     
256. John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 7 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 32–36 (2010) (performing statistical analysis and finding the following factors 
applied by courts in veil piercing cases: fraud/misrepresentation (49.2%), owner control/dominance 
(48.6%), commingling of funds (38.1%), undercapitalization (32.6%), non-functioning leadership 
(30.3%), overlap (28.7%), unfairness/injustice (28.5%), nonexistent leadership (22.1%), assumption 
of risk (3.9%)); see also Oh, supra note 255, at 90 (“[Q]uite predictable suspects comprise the most 
common instrumental rationales: commingling, control or domination, injustice or unfairness, fraud 
or misrepresentation, and inadequate capitalization.”); Thompson, supra note 245, at 1044 (reporting 
empirical work). 
257. FLETCHER CYC., supra note 125, § 41.50 (Analysis of specific factors—Commingling of 
assets); see, e.g., Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251, 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding commingling 
of assets because shareholder gave corporate funds to another corporation, used corporate property 
for the benefit of other corporations, and paid personal bills with corporate funds, including donations 
to charitable causes). 
258. FLETCHER CYC., supra note 125, § 41.10 (alter ego or mere instrumentality doctrine). 
259. See, e.g., Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that piercing is 
appropriate when a party has “such domination of a corporation as in reality to negate its separate 
personality”). 
260. Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 606 (Cal. 1985) (quoting Automotriz Del Golfo 
De Cal. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1957)); see also FLETCHER CYC., supra note 125, § 41.30 
(determinative factors in general) (noting the “two general elements required by most jurisdictions” 
are such a “unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the 
individual no longer exist [and], the circumstances must indicate that adherence to the fiction of 
separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice”); PRESSER, supra note 245, 
at 138 (referring to the Automotriz test as the “standard two-part test in use in many jurisdictions”). 
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corporate identity in the circumstances would “defeat the rights and 
equities of third persons.”261 
B. Claiming an Exemption Based on Unity of Interest with the 
Corporation Should Factor into the Veil Piercing Analysis 
Scholars have noted the logical fit between veil piercing and the 
rationale behind religious exemption claims made by corporations.262 
Even before Hobby Lobby was decided, a group of prominent corporate 
scholars argued that religious exemptions for corporations raise veil 
piercing issues because those exemptions rely on a sufficient unity of 
interest between shareholder and corporation to allow the religious beliefs 
of the individuals to carry over to the corporation.263 They argued the 
petitioners in Hobby Lobby, in fact, were asking the Court to disregard the 
corporate veil so that they could be treated as one and the same as their 
corporations—a controversial practice referred to as reverse veil 
piercing.264 The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the argument that 
Congress intended that corporate law’s separation requirement should 
deny shareholders the right to raise RFRA claims on behalf of themselves 
and their corporations.265 Since the decision, scholars have urged reversal 
on the grounds that the decision is inconsistent with the veil piercing 
doctrine.266 
The Court’s decision that Congress intended that shareholders be 
allowed to use their corporation to exercise their personal religion does 
not necessarily settle the question of how states may respond when 
                                                     
261. Mesler, 702 P.2d at 607 (quoting Kohn v. Kohn, 214 P.2d 71, 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)). 
262. See, e.g., Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 195, at 7–8 (using veil piercing and 
reverse veil piercing doctrine to argue against allowing RFRA exemption); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Using Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 
GREEN BAG 2d 235, 236–37 (2013) (arguing that reverse veil piercing provides the analytical 
framework to disregard the corporate entity to allow shareholders to exercise religion through the 
corporation); Goforth, supra note 223, at 97 (concluding that veil piercing doctrine is evidence that 
the Hobby Lobby decision is incompatible with state corporate law); Mohapatra, supra note 76, at 
169–75 (describing arguments relating to veil piercing for and against allowing corporate religious 
claims). 
263. See Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 195, at 6. 
264. See id. at 16–18; Bainbridge, supra note 262, at 237 (arguing that reverse veil piercing 
“provides the analytical framework currently missing” from the lower court cases granting 
exemptions). 
265. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) 
(“Congress provided protection for people like the Hahns and Greens by employing a familiar legal 
fiction: It included corporations within RFRA’s definition of ‘persons.’”). 
266. See generally Goforth, supra note 223; see also Mohapatra, supra note 76, at 169–75. 
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shareholders do.267 Corporate law professors from the University of 
California Berkeley raised this point to the Department of Health and 
Human Services in a comment on the definition of “eligible organization” 
for purposes of claiming a Hobby Lobby exemption.268 They argued that 
to qualify for a RFRA exemption, “shareholders of a corporation should 
have to certify that they and the corporation have a unity in identity and 
interests, and therefore the corporation should be viewed as the 
shareholders’ alter ego.”269 The Berkeley professors recognized that such 
a certification would likely be considered a factor in any veil piercing 
action later brought against the shareholder claiming the exemption.270 
While scholars have discussed the lack of separation implicit in the 
Hobby Lobby opinion and the connection between the requirement of 
legal separation and veil piercing, what is missing from the literature is an 
analysis of how states may adapt their existing corporate doctrine in light 
of the Hobby Lobby decision.271 This Part provides a framework for state 
courts to utilize to better define the nature of their corporate law relating 
to separation and corporate purpose. It concludes that there is a strong 
legal argument available to states that a past claim for an exemption based 
on the unity of interest with a shareholder’s corporation should be a factor 
in the veil piercing analysis. In light of the Court’s broad language 
regarding corporate law, states are not assured of success but, at the very 
                                                     
267. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 598–99 (arguing that while the U.S. Supreme Court decides if 
“the corporation is, as a general matter, a kind of entity capable of [a] right,” states are generally 
responsible for determining whether a corporation “has been constituted with the power to do 
whatever it is the right immunizes”). 
268. Letter from Robert P. Bartlett III et al., Professors of Law, Univ. of Cal., Berkley Sch. of Law, 
to Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 8, 2014) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Berkley Letter]. 
269. Id. at 2. 
270. Id. at 7 n.25. Rather than taking a narrow view of corporate eligibility, the Trump 
administration has finalized rules that open the door for any corporation to claim an exemption if they 
object to any contraception coverage on religious or moral grounds. See Religious Exemptions and 
Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 
Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 147) (allowing any corporate entity to claim an exemption from the contraceptive mandate on 
religious grounds); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive 
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (allowing small businesses to claim religious or 
moral exemptions to the contraceptive mandate). 
271. The Court will need to utilize the same lack of separation rationale in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
to find standing to reach the claims of the corporation involved, making this strategy relevant for 
potential future First Amendment claims as well. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Corporate Law 
Professors in Support of Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 5127303 at *2–3. 
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least, asserting it will force the Supreme Court to be upfront about how 
far it intends to go in preempting state corporate law. 
1. The Legal Argument for Veil Piercing 
As discussed, the test for veil piercing is not uniform across all 
jurisdictions but, in general, it requires finding a unity of interest that 
demonstrates the corporation is the alter ego of the shareholder and that 
equity counsels in favor of ignoring the corporate form.272 In order to 
claim a religious exemption, shareholders must demonstrate that they 
have disregarded the corporate form in order to utilize the corporation for 
their own personal ends.273 These prerequisites for claiming an exemption 
are related to the veil piercing inquiry both with respect to the lack of 
separation and corporate purpose. 
Legal separation is the hallmark of the corporate form.274 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the veil piercing doctrine focuses on the 
separateness of the corporation.275 The lack of separation appears in 
courts’ reasoning as an independent question and also within several of 
the commonly used factors to justify veil piercing, including commingling 
and control or domination by the shareholder.276 At its core, the veil 
piercing doctrine reflects that limited liability is premised on the legal 
distinction between shareholder and corporation.277 
                                                     
272. See supra notes 255–256 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra notes 194–198 and accompanying text. 
274. See Rutledge, supra note 198, at 18 (“There exists a real distinction between the corporation 
and its shareholders. The shareholders do not ‘do business as’ the corporation, but rather, the 
corporation does business as distinct legal being.”); supra note 194. 
275. See FLETCHER CYC., supra note 125, § 41.10 (“The alter ego theory applies when there is 
such unity between a corporation and an individual that the separateness of the corporation has 
ceased.”); Presser, supra note 239, at 412–13 (noting that some jurisdictions “have hinted” that 
veil piercing does not require anything more than showing the shareholder and corporation are the 
alter ego of each other). 
276. See, e.g., Medlock v. Medlock, 642 N.W.2d 113, 124 (Neb. 2002) (noting that a factor relevant 
to piercing is “the fact that the corporation is a mere facade for the personal dealings of the shareholder 
and that the operations of the corporation are carried on by the shareholder in disregard of the 
corporate entity”); Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1031–32 (Wyo. 2000) (finding corporation was 
a “sham” based on commingling of assets); Presser, supra note 239, at 412 (noting that the alter ego 
test frequently comes down to domination or control by shareholders). 
277. See Rutledge, supra note 198, at 35–36 (“The corporation is not an agent acting on behalf of 
the shareholders; were that the case, then the shareholders would be personally responsible for all the 
debts and obligations incurred by the corporation on behalf of its principals, and the corporation would 
not be liable thereon.”). 
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The Hobby Lobby decision is based on the lack of separation between 
shareholders claiming the exemption and the corporation.278 Scholars 
have noted that in order to claim a RFRA exemption under the opinion, 
shareholders must demonstrate a unity of interest with the corporation 
such that it is appropriate to ignore traditional legal separation.279 The 
petitions in both Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop made such 
claims in their filings with the Court.280 In determining whether veil 
piercing is appropriate, future state courts should be permitted to consider 
the parties’ previous admissions that they meet the unity of interest criteria 
when claiming an exemption. 
The connection between corporate purpose and veil piercing is perhaps 
less obvious than the related concept of separation, but is no less important 
for state courts to consider. In the Hobby Lobby opinion, the Court 
emphasized that every state authorizes corporations to be formed “for any 
lawful purpose or business.”281 The Court reasoned from that language 
that corporations may be utilized to exercise their shareholders’ personal 
religious beliefs.282 But that phrase was never intended to allow 
shareholders to further purely personal ends through the corporate form.283 
The “any lawful purpose” language was adopted by states to further the 
profit-making ability of the corporation by giving “greater flexibility to 
                                                     
278. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (holding 
that the corporate right to free exercise is protected to “protect[] the religious liberty of the humans 
who own and control those companies”); cf. Hardee, supra note 44, at 23–25 (arguing that RFRA 
exemptions require the shareholders ignore the corporate form); Mark, supra note 171, at 541 (noting 
that the “entities exist solely as vehicles” to provide protection for the shareholders). 
279. See Mark, supra note 171, at 541 (noting that Hobby Lobby sees the corporate entity merely 
“as vehicles” used to further shareholders’ personal beliefs); Taub, supra note 89, at 405 (arguing that 
Hobby Lobby permits RFRA exemptions based on three conditions, including having “human owners 
that [are] co-extensive with the corporation”). 
280. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–6, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2016 WL 3971309, at *4–6 
(arguing that Mr. Phillips has “integrated” his faith into the business); Brief for Petitioners at 5, 17, 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2014) (No. 13-356), 
2014 WL 173487, at *5, *17 (“[T]hey cannot separate their religious beliefs from their business 
practices . . . . When a religious family runs a business, the family itself is impacted by what the 
business does, or what it is required to do. There is no separating the Hahens’ faith from their business 
or its actions.”). 
281. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770–71 (quoting 1 J. COX & T. HAZEN, TREATISE OF THE LAW 
OF CORPORATIONS § 4:1 (3d ed. 2010)). 
282. Id. at 2771. 
283. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-eyed Understanding of 
the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 783–84 (2015) (noting that the language was adopted “to give corporate 
managers the authority to move freely into new business lines and out of old ones without the 
inhibiting effect of old style charters and their complement, the ultra vires doctrine”).  
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corporate managers to expand into new business areas over time” without 
the need for long lists of particular business purposes in their charter.284 
This purpose is in line with the rationale for limited liability as a tool to 
spur economic growth.285 
Veil piercing doctrine supports the argument that limited liability was 
not designed to allow individuals to place a liability shield around their 
personal lives. The case law is replete with veils being pierced because 
shareholders used the corporation to further their own personal ends: to 
remodel their home,286 pay for vacations and cars,287 and for other 
personal expenses.288 The veil is pierced in these cases not because, for 
example, remodeling a home is not “a lawful purpose” for a corporation—
there are corporations that remodel homes for profit and corporations that 
donate home remodels to the needy in their community.289 The veil is 
pierced in these circumstances because remodeling the shareholder’s own 
home furthers the shareholder’s interests, not the corporation’s interest. 
Therefore, there is no justification for limited liability. 
A state need not embrace profit maximization as the sole justification 
for the corporation in order to utilize this reasoning.290 Even assuming that 
corporations may engage in activities to help others regardless of 
corporate profit, it does not support the argument that shareholders can 
use the corporation to further their own personal ends.291 Courts have 
recognized this distinction and pierced even when the shareholder had 
                                                     
284. Ackerman & Cole, supra note 193, at 957–58; see also Strine, supra note 283, 783–84. 
285. See supra notes 236–241 and accompanying text. 
286. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Noble, 193 Wash. App. 1040, No. 71206-3-I, 2016 WL 1734259 
(Ct. App. May 2, 2016) (unpublished decision) (piercing the veil of an LLC because, inter alia, the 
LLC paid for the owners’ home remodel). 
287. See, e.g., Medlock v. Medlock, 642 N.W.2d 113, 125 (Neb. 2002) (piercing veil of nonprofit 
church during divorce proceedings because husband exerted control over the corporation, as 
demonstrated by using corporate funds for personal vacations and vehicles, among other personal 
expenses). 
288. See, e.g., Shisgal v. Brown, 801 N.Y.S.2d 581, 584 (App. Div. 2005) (denying motion to 
dismiss veil piercing claim because of allegations that the shareholders used the company for personal 
expenses such as plastic surgery and personal parking tickets); NEC Elecs. Inc. v. Hurt, 256 Cal. Rptr. 
441, 443 (Ct. App. 1989) (piercing because corporation paid personal expenses of shareholder); see 
also Rutledge, supra note 198, at 19–20 (“The property of the corporation is that of the corporation 
as a legal entity distinct from the shareholders, and those assets are not available to satisfy the personal 
debts of the shareholders.”). 
289. See, e.g., Corporate Partners, HABITAT FOR HUMAN., 
https://www.habitat.org/about/partners/corporate [https://perma.cc/M67Q-AJ2C] (listing corporate 
partners of Habitat for Humanity, a nonprofit organization that builds homes for people in need). 
290. See supra Section I.B. (discussing debate around profit maximization principle). 
291. See supra notes 116–119 and accompanying text (describing difference between CSR and 
exemptions based on personal religious exercise). 
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personal motives to give corporate funds to others, including personal 
donations to the shareholder’s church.292 
The Hobby Lobby decision predicates the corporations’ RFRA 
exemptions on the requirement that they be motivated by the 
shareholders’ personal, sincere religious beliefs.293 The majority makes no 
pretense that the corporation itself can hold sincere religious beliefs and 
instead rests its holding on the fact that the shareholders are advancing 
their own personal beliefs.294 These beliefs are necessarily personal as a 
corporation can no more hold sincere religious beliefs than it can desire a 
home remodel. A shareholder using the corporate form to further either 
personal end arguably creates conflict with the purpose of the corporation 
underlying the veil piercing doctrine.295 While this distinction may appear 
a mere technicality, it has a long pedigree in veil piercing cases. 
It is true that when determining whether the corporation is an alter ego 
of the shareholder courts have historically focused on the corporation 
being used to further the shareholders’ financial ends, as those were the 
only ends available to shareholders.296 Now that the Court has created a 
new way, shareholders can further personal, non-financial ends through 
the corporation; however, courts will need to address the impact of such 
use. In doing so, the religious nature of the shareholders’ personal ends 
should not be outcome determinative.297 Veil piercing can provide state 
                                                     
292. See, e.g., In re Crabtree, 554 B.R. 174, 198 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016) (piercing corporate veil 
in bankruptcy case because shareholder commingled funds, including the corporation making “a 
personal contribution . . . to their church”); Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251, 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1981) (piercing veil because shareholder made personal donations to charity that were reimbursed by 
the corporation and gave corporate funds to a friend); Shisgal, 801 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (denying motion 
to dismiss on piercing claim because corporate funds were used to help “friends, relatives and 
associates”). 
293. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774–75 (2014) 
(stating that the sincerity of the corporation’s “beliefs” are determined by the sincerity of the 
shareholders’ beliefs); Taub, supra note 89, at 419–20 (arguing that the Court’s language 
demonstrates that exemptions are predicated on the requirement that they be motivated by the 
shareholders’ shared sincere religious beliefs). 
294. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (“the sincerely held religious beliefs of the 
companies’ owners”); id. at 2764–65 (describing the Hahn’s religious beliefs and how they exercise 
those beliefs through Conestoga); id. at 2765–66 (describing the Greens’ beliefs and how they 
exercise those beliefs through Hobby Lobby and Mardel); see also Hardee, supra note 44, at 28–29 
(analyzing language regarding the personal nature of the shareholders’ beliefs throughout the 
opinion). 
295. See supra note 292 (listing cases holding that personal expenditures justify piercing).  
296. See supra notes 286–288 and accompanying text (describing cases involving corporate 
expenditures for personal expenses). 
297. For example, to allow shareholders to use corporate funds to pay for a religious pilgrimage to 
Mecca with impunity but then pierce when a shareholder uses corporate funds for a vacation would 
lead to inequitable results for corporate creditors. In fact, courts have not treated religion as taking 
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courts the opportunity to clarify the purpose of the corporation vis-à-vis 
the shareholder’s personal, non-financial interests. 
2. Analyzing the Effect of Religious Exemptions on Veil Piercing 
A shareholder’s previous claim to an exemption based on a unity of 
interest with the corporation could play out in different ways in the fact-
intensive veil piercing inquiry.298 The strongest case for piercing would 
be one in which a corporation incurs a debt related to the religious identity 
that was grounds for the prior exemption. For example, consider a 
hypothetical involving a corporation, Corp., Inc., that had claimed a 
RFRA exemption to the contraceptive mandate based on the sincere 
religious beliefs of its two controlling shareholders. It is then discovered 
that Corp., Inc. has been paying female employees less than its male 
counterparts and not promoting women to leadership positions because 
mid-level managers believed that doing so would contradict the 
company’s religious principles.299 A class of female employees sues under 
the state’s anti-discrimination statute and wins a substantial judgment 
against Corp., Inc. The corporation has insufficient assets to satisfy this 
judgment, so the class seeks to pierce the corporate veil and hold the 
shareholders personally liable for this debt. The court analyzing this veil 
piercing claim might use the shareholders’ previous exemption in several 
ways. 
The court could make the fact that the shareholder has previously 
claimed an exemption based on a unity of interest with the corporation a 
new, additional factor in the veil piercing test. This factor might be 
particularly strong in this case as what passed through the veil 
previously—the shareholders’ religious beliefs—is closely related to the 
liability in the underlying employment litigation. In other words, if the 
corporation has been deemed to have a religious identity based on the 
shareholders’ personal religion, then liability based on the exercise of the 
                                                     
personal use outside the reach of the veil piercing doctrine. See In re Crabtree, 554 B.R. at 198 
(piercing veil of corporation in bankruptcy in part because corporate funds were used to make 
“personal contributions” to the shareholders’ church); Medlock v. Medlock, 642 N.W.2d 113, 128 
(Neb. 2002) (piercing veil of nonprofit church because defendant controlled it as his alter ego). 
298. See FLETCHER CYC., supra note 125, § 41.10 (“The propriety of piercing the corporate veil is 
highly dependent upon the equities of the situation, and the inquiry tends to be highly fact-driven.”). 
299. This hypothetical is in line with claims that have been made by for-profit companies seeking 
to evade anti-discrimination laws because their religious beliefs counsel “that women’s place in the 
home and the Bible gives husbands authority superior to that of their wives.” Sepper, supra note 2, at 
1515 (describing past religious objections to laws in the context of religious discrimination lawsuits). 
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corporation’s religion should likewise pass back through the veil to the 
shareholder. 
Alternatively, or in addition, the shareholders’ previous exemption 
could factor into the court’s analysis of traditional veil piercing factors. 
The fact that the shareholders wield the corporation to further their 
personal beliefs could be used to demonstrate control and domination of 
the entity by the shareholders.300 A previous exemption could be taken 
into account using the commingling factor in two ways. First, a court 
could determine that in claiming that the expenditure of corporate funds 
to pay for employees’ contraceptive coverage is attributed to the 
shareholders personally, they are commingling corporate and personal 
assets.301 Second, even without financial expenditures by the corporation, 
the court could consider the commingling of the shareholders’ personal 
purpose and the corporation’s economic purpose, to find the shareholders 
are using the corporation to further their own personal ends. Finally, in 
weighing the injustice or unfairness of maintaining the corporate form, a 
court may entertain the argument that it is generally unfair to allow 
someone to pierce the veil at their own behest and for their personal 
benefit and then disavow any debt of the corporation arising from it. 
Similar to using exemptions as a stand-alone factor, the injustice claim is 
strongest when the underlying liability is directly linked to the right the 
shareholders have previously exercised via the corporation. Taken 
collectively, these arguments could make a strong case for the court to use 
its powers in equity to pierce the corporate veil of the hypothetical Corp., 
Inc. under these circumstances, even if no other veil piercing factors were 
present.302 
Not all veil piercing claims would necessarily give the same weight to 
the shareholders’ previous exemptions. If the corporate debt was from a 
slip and fall negligence action or a contract claim by a supplier, there 
                                                     
300. See Mitchell, supra note 230, at 1169–70 (noting that closely held corporations are more likely 
to have their veil pierced because courts see control over the corporation as linked to responsibility 
for the corporation’s acts). 
301. This was the argument of Judge Rovner in dissent in one of the cases leading up to Hobby 
Lobby. See Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 858 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“To suggest, 
for purposes of the RFRA, that monies used to fund the [corporation’s] health plan—including, in 
particular, any monies spent paying for employee contraceptive care—ought to be treated as monies 
from the [shareholders’] own pockets would be to make an argument for piercing the corporate veil.”). 
302. For example, even if Corp., Inc. had observed all corporate formalities such as maintaining 
corporate books and holding regular board meetings. See Oh, supra note 255, at 138 (noting that 
failure to observe corporate formalities is a factor considered by courts but carries more weight for 
contract claims). 
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would be less to tie the exemption to the corporate debt.303 However, a 
connection between the debt in question and the factors favoring piercing 
is not always required.304 The shareholders’ previous claim of a unity of 
interest with the corporation could merely serve as one additional fact to 
use in determining whether the shareholders treated the corporation as a 
separate entity or as their alter ego. In doing so, the court should be 
cognizant of “balanc[ing] the benefits of limited liability against the 
costs,” including the harm from using the corporate form to evade 
protections for third parties.305 
3. Considering Prior Exemptions Faces Substantial Hurdles 
The argument that states can consider prior exemptions made by the 
corporation in the veil piercing analysis is likely to be met with opposition. 
The Court in Hobby Lobby held that it is inappropriate under RFRA to 
“discriminate” against individuals who decide to incorporate.306 Although 
RFRA does not apply to the states, the idea that state law may not impose 
consequences on corporations who claim RFRA exemptions could find 
purchase in arguments that veil piercing creates a burden on the exercise 
of a federal right.307 
A burden argument would likely boil down to a question of defining 
the appropriate baseline for determining what constitutes a “burden” on 
religion.308 If the baseline of state law is defined as providing limited 
liability for any corporation conducting business for any purpose, then 
forcing individuals to give up their rights under RFRA “in exchange” for 
limited liability could be problematic.309 But such a baseline ignores the 
                                                     
303. See, e.g., Fanning v. Brown, 85 P.3d 841, 847 (Okla. 2004) (holding trial court erred in 
denying motion to dismiss veil piercing claim where allegations of abuse of corporate form related to 
the neglect and abuse of plaintiff that formed basis of the claim); Presser, supra note 239, at 412 
(noting that some jurisdictions require fraud for veil piercing for contractual creditors). 
304. See Presser, supra note 239, at 412–13 (noting that jurisdictions differ on whether they require 
injustice beyond use of the corporation as an alter ego and what that injustice needs to entail). 
305. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 231, at 93, 109 (discussing that courts balance the economic 
gain of limited liability against the social costs of excessive risk taking). 
306. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
307. If in the future the Court provides a constitutional right to corporations to engage in the 
expressive speech of their shareholders or grants corporations a free exercise right, the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions could similarly be raised. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 653–54 
(recognizing the potential challenge to states ability to abrogate corporate rights). 
308. See Sepper, supra note 2, at 1471–77 (describing how religious liberty claims by corporations 
replicate the baseline problems inherent in Lochner and how setting the baseline can be outcome 
determinative). 
309. There is language in the Hobby Lobby decision that suggests this is how the majority views 
the baseline for corporations. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767 (noting with disapproval that the 
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“artificiality of the market.”310 The incorporated form is not the “natural” 
state of the market—it is a result of states altering the market to provide 
special benefits, including limited liability, in exchange for agreeing to a 
state-imposed structure and purpose.311 
The more appropriate baseline is that people—even associations of 
people engaged in business—are responsible for their own debts unless 
they have established a legally separate entity that operates to further its 
own economic ends, rather than the shareholders’ personal ends.312 This 
is a more accurate description of state law.313 With the baseline set as such, 
there is a strong argument that under the state’s definition of a limited 
liability entity, shareholders who utilize their corporations for personal 
ends are not burdened at all; they simply do not qualify for the privilege. 
Until the federal courts explicitly preempt state power to define 
corporate structure, power, and purpose, how much power states retain to 
define corporations remains an open question. Like the power to make 
corporate political expenditures, it seems clear that states do not have the 
power to prevent looking through the corporate form to allow 
shareholders to claim exemptions under RFRA.314 There is still a viable 
argument, however, that states can determine when a shareholder has 
misused the corporate form under state law and the consequences that 
flow from it.315 While the outcome of that argument is uncertain, in 
advancing it the states will, at minimum, force the Supreme Court to be 
transparent about the extent to which it intends to preempt state power to 
define corporations. 
                                                     
HHS’s position forces business people to face a “difficult choice” between giving up “judicial 
protection of their religious liberty or forgo[ing] the benefits . . . of operating as corporations”). 
310. See Sepper, supra note 2, at 1463 (arguing that the Court in the infamous Lochner case made 
the mistake of assuming the baseline for evaluating burdens is the market status quo). 
311. See Hardee, supra note 44 (describing the evolution of state law from unlimited liability 
entities to limited liability corporations). 
312. See Sepper, supra note 2, at 1484–85 (noting that incorporating under state law for corporate 
benefits is engagement with the state that alters the market baseline). 
313. See supra Section II.B. 
314. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (holding that Congress intended to include shareholders 
acting through the corporate form under the definition of “persons” for purposes of RFRA); Buccola, 
supra note 5, at 599 (recognizing that “states cannot overrule the Court’s understanding of corporate 
rights”). 
315. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 599 (arguing that states can “disempower the corporations they 
create from doing the kinds of things that implicate disfavored federal rights”). 
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C. The Practical Advantages of Adapting Veil Piercing to Corporate 
Rights 
In addition to its substantive fit, utilizing the veil piercing doctrine has 
many practical advantages that make it a good test case to begin to push 
back on the federalization of corporate law. First, there is a strong 
argument that the internal affairs doctrine does not apply to veil piercing 
claims, thus preventing corporate flight and ensuring the benefits of the 
change inure to the citizens of the state.316 Second, as an equitable 
common law doctrine, state courts can evolve the doctrine slowly for 
maximum impact with minimal disruptions to businesses in the state.317 
1. The Internal Affairs Doctrine May Be Disregarded for Veil 
Piercing Claims 
If a state wishes to protect its citizens from the power wielded by the 
corporations that employ and serve them, changes to the law must apply 
to all corporations doing business in the state. The potential for unlimited 
personal liability for shareholders is a powerful motivator for corporate 
shareholders.318 If the internal affairs doctrine applies, a corporation that 
wishes to avoid the host state’s protective measures can simply 
reincorporate in another state to take advantage of a more accommodating 
corporate law.319 
For veil piercing claims, some courts currently use the internal affairs 
doctrine and apply the law of the state of incorporation, while others 
already apply general choice-of-law principles.320 Professor Crespi makes 
a compelling argument that the internal affairs doctrine should not apply 
                                                     
316. See infra Section III.C.1. 
317. States can take a page from the Delaware Chancery Court for the best way to encourage 
business leaders to act without putting economic priorities at risk. See, e.g., infra notes 331–332 and 
accompanying text (describing how Delaware Chancery Court previews changes to the law through 
dicta, academic papers, and participation in conferences, allowing companies to adjust their business 
practices before the imposition of liability on any one company). 
318. See Thompson, supra note 225, at 6 (“Limited liability is a much more important determinant 
of business form than any particular governance rule in that entrepreneurs will react more to any 
change in the liability risk than to a change in a governance rule.”). 
319. See id. (noting that entrepreneurs will opt for liability benefits over internal governance rules). 
It is possible that corporations will still choose to stay in a state where veil piercing is more likely if 
they see other benefits from that choice. See Crespi, supra note 30, at 101 (hypothesizing that veil 
piercing doctrine might not be the most important factor to shareholders in choosing place of 
incorporation). Shareholders who wish to claim exemptions, however, might be more motivated to 
avoid the law than an average shareholder as their risk for piercing would be known. 
320. See Crespi, supra note 30, at 90 nn.13–14 (citing choice-of-law determinations from various 
jurisdictions). Only Texas requires by statute that the internal affairs doctrine be used. Id. at 88. 
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to veil piercing claims.321 The principles of equity inherent in veil piercing 
suggest that general choice-of-law principles be used, giving “courts the 
latitude to consider the interests of each jurisdiction involved in protecting 
the legitimate rights and interests of its citizens.”322 Tort claimants are 
involuntary creditors external to the corporate governance structure and 
“simple fairness concerns” mandate the use of law appropriate to the tort 
claim rather than defaulting to the law of the state of incorporation.323 For 
contract claims, if the choice-of-law is specified for piercing claims, that 
choice should govern.324 However, if the contract does not state which law 
should be used for piercing claims, Professor Crespi argues that standard 
choice-of-law analysis should apply because a contract’s general choice-
of-law provision is insufficient to infer that the parties negotiated a 
preference for veil piercing controversies.325 
Balancing the interests of all jurisdictions involved is the better method 
for both tort and contract creditors because it “removes the ability of 
corporations and their shareholders to limit the shareholders’ exposure to 
piercing claims merely by selectively incorporating” in jurisdictions they 
consider favorable.326 This prevents shareholders and corporations from 
“externalizing the consequences of their inequitable conduct.”327 
Rejecting the internal affairs doctrine for veil piercing is less 
problematic than doing so for matters of pure internal governance, like 
shareholder voting. Adding prior exemptions as a factor to the veil 
piercing test does not create “inconsistent internal governance demands” 
because the decision to claim an exemption is not a matter of internal 
governance procedure but rather a substantive business decision, and not 
one any corporation is required to make.328 
2. As an Equitable Common Law Doctrine, Veil Piercing Provides 
Flexibility and Allows for Incremental Change 
There are also practical benefits deriving from states limiting corporate 
power through an equitable common law doctrine like veil piercing. 
                                                     
321. Id. at 125–26. Professor Crespi also argues that the same analysis counsels using general choice-
of-law analysis for piercing claims regarding other business entities, i.e., LLCs or LLPs. Id. at 127. 
322. Id. at 108. 
323. Id. at 98. 
324. See id. at 105. 
325. See id. at 107. 
326. Id. at 125; see also id. at 98. 
327. Id. at 125. 
328. See id. at 103. 
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Common law allows for incremental changes to the law focused on cases 
that provide the most compelling argument for legal innovation.329 Given 
the potential pushback from federal courts to states attempting to limit the 
use of corporate exemptions, incremental change may be wise. It will 
allow state courts to consider exemptions in the cases presenting the 
strongest argument for finding a lack of separation or improper corporate 
purpose, thereby clarifying the state’s law regarding both. Once a state 
has clearly defined the requirements of separation and corporate purpose 
in order to receive limited liability under its law, it will force the federal 
courts to either accept the state’s power to do so or explicitly preempt it. 
Common law adjudication has the potential to disrupt corporations 
doing business in the state by retroactively holding an unsuspecting 
shareholder personally liable for massive corporate debts.330 If used 
carefully, however, the common law can allow evolution of the veil 
piercing doctrine without major business disruption. For guidance on how 
to do so, state courts should look to the nation’s premier corporate court—
the Delaware Court of Chancery. The Delaware Court of Chancery 
frequently uses “careful and considered” dicta to regulate corporate 
conduct “without requiring the litigants before it to bear the cost (through 
retrospective application).”331 By announcing potential changes to 
corporate governance rules through well-reasoned dicta in legal opinions, 
participation in legal conferences, and publishing academic pieces, the 
members of the Delaware Court of Chancery engage in an ongoing 
dialogue with the business and legal community.332 In this way, changes 
to the law can be phased in and the theoretical kinks worked out over the 
course of several opinions.333 In a similar vein, careful consideration and 
discussion of how claiming corporate exemptions may affect the limited 
liability of shareholders by state courts through these channels can both 
put shareholders on notice of potential personal liability and allow for the 
development of the doctrine prior to a legal challenge. 
                                                     
329. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the Common 
Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241, 1255 (2015) (arguing that “the common law’s conceptual 
architecture . . . is intrinsically designed to accommodate the process of incremental normative 
change over time”). 
330. See William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
570, 591 (2012) (“It may be that the retroactive application of new rules is a necessary if unfortunate 
byproduct of the traditional common law system . . . .”). 
331. Id. at 590 (arguing that dicta allows innovation in the law while still minimizing uncertainty). 
332. See id. at 591–92 (describing process and various corporate governance rules that have 
evolved through it). 
333. See id. at 592–93 (describing “a long-running debate” over a potential change in review 
standards carried out through court dicta and legal commentary by academics and practitioners). 
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CONCLUSION 
The laws governing corporations are in flux. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has greatly expanded corporate rights and, consequently, expanded the 
power of corporations to both influence the democratic process and claim 
exemptions from democratically enacted laws designed to protect third 
parties. This has upset the balance of power inherent in state corporate 
law, which has long placed the regulation of harm in the realm of external 
regulation rather than corporate governance. In light of recent cases, states 
have no choice but to respond to the Supreme Court’s instructions to flesh 
out these new corporate rights within existing corporate governance 
structures. 
But states do have decisions to make about how their law should adapt. 
They can either incorporate new rights into their existing framework 
without concern for the side effects or they can rethink the balance of 
power and pursue a path that restrains corporate might when third parties 
are harmed. This Article advocates the latter. Starting with a relatively 
minor change to veil piercing doctrine to discourage corporations from 
utilizing exemptions to the law, this Article shows how states can help 
protect the interests of its human citizens. Such a change will also put 
states in the best position to test how far the Supreme Court is willing to 
go in federalizing corporate law. The veil piercing doctrine is not a 
panacea, but it is a good first step in reasserting the right of states to define 
their corporate creations. 
